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ARTICLES
RACE, TRUST, ALTRUISM, AND RECIPROCITY
George W. Dent, Jr. *
I. INTRODUCTION
Trust, altruism, and reciprocity are attracting growing atten-
tion from scholars. Interest began with psychological experiments
showing that people often are altruistic, trust others, and recipro-
cate the benevolence of others far more than economic models of
"rational" human selfishness predict.' These findings inspired so-
cial scientists to discover what factors promote or hinder coopera-
tion.2 Legal scholars have employed this learning to determine
how the law does or could facilitate or discourage cooperation in
many contexts, including business transactions and the work-
place.3 The influence of race on cooperation has been studied in
specific areas, but so far no one has considered how the new
learning might improve race relations and racial equality. This
Article makes an initial effort to do so.
Trust in others is essential to human interaction, especially in
dealings too complex for the parties' rights and duties to be de-
* Schott-van den Eynden Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
LL.M., 1981, New York University; J.D. 1973, B.A., 1969, Columbia University. For help-
ful comments, my thanks to Mel Durchslag, Jonathan Entin, and Peter Gerhart.
1. "The empirical challenge to the self-interest hypothesis began in the 1980s when
experimental economists started to study bilateral bargaining games in controlled labora-
tory settings." Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1663 (2003).
2. Cf. id. at 1665-67 (discussing the theory of reciprocal fairness).
3. See generally Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Criti-
cal Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757 (2003) (reviewing CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS AND A
NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (Franciso Valdes et al. eds., 2002)).
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tailed in writing. Trust grows when each side's contribution is re-
ciprocated by the other's, but not if reciprocity is withheld. Like-
wise, trust shrinks rapidly if one party abuses the other's trust by
acting opportunistically. People often eschew gain and help the
needy; but altruism dwindles if the recipients do not seem truly
needy, do not try to help themselves, or if others who could help
refuse to do so and "free ride" on those who are altruistic.
The dearth of racial trust in America is dramatically mani-
fested in the separation so often chosen by both blacks and
whites.4 Distrust blocks cooperation and altruism between the
races and obstructs efforts to solve virtually every social prob-
lem.5 Part I of this Article reviews the learning about trust, altru-
ism, and reciprocity. Part II applies this knowledge to better un-
derstand racial division and inequality in America, and why
many policies and positions do not ameliorate these ills and in-
deed may exacerbate them. Part III discusses our goals in race re-
lations, Part IV prescribes principles to foster interracial trust,
and Part V proposes some specific steps to reduce racial inequal-
ity while building trust.
II. TRUST, ALTRUISM, NORMS, AND LAW
A. Trust, Fairness, and Reciprocity
The social sciences long assumed that people act only from ma-
terial self-interest and are suspicious of others.6 Accordingly, it
was assumed that an individual transacts with another only
when, by his own actions, or by invoking the law, he can avoid
any noncooperation or opportunism of the other that would deny
him the material gain he expects from the transaction.7
4. See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION
OF PROSPERITY 295-306 (1995) (discussing levels of trust within several American ethnic
groups).
5. Id.
6. "[Elconomic analysis generally begins by assuming that people behave like homo
economicus-that they are perfectly rational and purely self-interested actors." Lynn A.
Stout, On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don't Want to Invite
Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (2003).
7. See id.
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If true, these assumptions pose many problems. First, no one
entering a contract completely foregoes trust and relies solely on
self-help or enforcement; no one contracts with someone who
swears to cheat whenever it suits him to do so.' Further, even
simple exchanges involve too many contingencies to be fully cov-
ered in a contract: "[a]ll contracts are incomplete."9 This is par-
ticularly true in complex transactions. The paradigm is marriage,
which entails so much interaction that no contract, however long,
could begin to specify the rights and duties of the spouses. The
same is true of intricate business deals, like joint ventures. Writ-
ten contracts are insufficient where it is hard to monitor the other
party's performance and to prove a breach to a court, as when a
party promises its best efforts over a long time in a complex pro-
ject.1"
A low level of trust suffices for the many contracts where the
parties need not work together after agreement is reached. Even
in a complex exchange, like a corporate merger, major terms can
be spelled out adequately and the threat of legal enforcement
largely deters opportunism. 1 Deeper cooperation is possible only
because the model of homo economicus is false; people often in-
teract on a basis of trust and benefit by so doing.12 People who
trust achieve "substantially higher efficiency levels" in their
transactions.13 For this reason many employers cultivate trust in
the workplace.' 4 Trust reduces transaction costs: "there is less
need to spell things out in lengthy contracts; less need to hedge
against unexpected contingencies; fewer disputes, and less need
8. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 25.
9. Scott, supra note 1, at 1641.
10. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract En-
forcement Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & ECON. 265, 267-68 (1988). A fully specified contract may
be impractical because "performance may be prohibitively costly to measure and to specify
in a way that contractual breach and the extent of damages can be proven to the satisfac-
tion of the court." Id. at 267-68; see also Ilya Segal, Complexity and Renegotiation: A
Foundation for Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 57, 58 (1999) (stating that con-
tracts tend to be less complete when the transaction is more complex).
11. See JORDAN D. LEWIS, TRUSTED PARTNERS: How COMPANIES BUILD MUTUAL
TRUST AND WIN TOGETHER 261-64 (1999).
12. See generally Stout, supra note 6, at 12 ("Social dilemma experiments accordingly
demonstrate, rather conclusively, that people often behave altruistically.").
13. Ernst Fehr & John A. List, The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives-Trust
and Trustworthiness Among CEO's 1, 17 (manuscript Nov. 2002); see also FUKUYAMA, su-
pra note 4, at 151 (cataloging the benefits of trust).
14. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 3, at 1789.
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to litigate if disputes arise."15 Conversely, "where trust is gone...
the agency costs incurred by the team members-the costs of mu-
tual monitoring if you will-are likely to increase."16 Benefits flow
from cooperation. In "a carefully worked out relationship one gets
performance only to the letter of the contract,"17 whereas in a
transaction based on trust, both sides may contribute more than
the minimum required by their contract. 8
Trust works because most people do not conform to the model
of narrow material selfishness. 9 Most people value "fairness and
reciprocity."2 ° Thus, in games in psychological experiments where
a player may choose either to keep an entire sum of money or to
share with other players, most people share.2 Most people also
reciprocate the fairness of others, "reward[ing] generous ... offers
with generous efforts (even when it is costly for them to do so)."22
Unfairness is also reciprocated. People who feel mistreated
usually retaliate even if they know that retaliation will be costly
for them. People judge others less from the effects of their ac-
tions than from their apparent intentions: "It is not what happens
in relations so much as how that is interpreted, and how people
infer and attribute competencies and motives to people that mat-
15. FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 151.
16. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust and Team Production in Post-Capitalist Society, 24 J.
CORP. L. 869, 870 (1999).
17. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,
28 AM. Soc. REV. 55, 64 (1963). The process of negotiating a contract may itself undermine
trust and cooperation. See supra note 10. Therefore, parties often forego contracts alto-
gether. This is typical in marriage. It is also done in some business deals. See LEWIS, supra
note 11, at 263.
18. See LEWIS, supra note 11, at 263-64.
19. See Stout, supra note 6, at 11-12.
20. Scott, supra note 1, at 1662.
21. See generally Robyn M. Dawes & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Cooperation, 2 J.
ECON. PERSP. 187, 192-95 (1988) (discussing altruism); Robyn M. Dawes et al., Coopera-
tion for the Benefit of Us-Not Me, or My Conscience, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 108-10
(Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990) (discussing experiments supporting group-identity hy-
pothesis); Robyn M. Dawes, Social Dilemmas, 31 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 169, 182-88 (1980)
[hereinafter Dawes, Social Dilemmas] (reviewing dilemma games studies); David Sally,
Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of Experiments from
1958 to 1992, 7 RATIONALITY & SOc'Y 58, 68 (1995).
22. Scott, supra note 1, at 1664.
23. See George Loewenstein, Emotions in Economic Theory and Economic Behavior,
90 AM. ECON. REV. 426, 429-30 (2000); Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game
Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281, 1284 (1993). An emotionally based com-
mitment to retaliate even at (short-term) cost to oneself and an ability to signal this (i.e.,
to warn others) may help to deter mistreatment by others. See ROBERT H. FRANK,
PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS 2 (1988).
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ters, in the formation or destruction of trust."24 A person's will-
ingness to trust and be fair is not the same in all circumstances
and for all other people; it depends on context and the identity of
the other. "Social capital"-that is, "social networks and the
norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from
them"2 -varies from culture to culture.26 Social capital promotes
economic growth; in nations with high social capital people can
more easily enter into the complex transactions that are crucial to
growth in this era of advanced technology and global competi-
tion.27
Trust also varies among subgroups.28 People "tend to gravitate
toward what is familiar and predictable [and] ... to shy away
from and mistrust what is different."29 "[Pirejudice may have evo-
lutionary roots, having developed as a quick, crude way for early
humans to protect themselves from danger."" How one classifies
24. BART NOOTEBOOM, TRUST: FORMS, FOUNDATIONS, FUNCTIONS, FAILURES AND
FIGURES 24 (2002); see also Scott, supra note 1, at 1666 (stating "the key is how a person
interprets the actions of the other party").
25. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY 19 (2000).
26. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 25-26; Joseph Henrich et al., In Search of Homo
Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 73,
76-77 (2001). To some extent, however, the tendency to reward cooperation and generosity
and to retaliate against unfairness seems to be biologically programmed. See ALEXANDER
J. FIELD, ALTRUISTICALLY INCLINED? THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES, EVOLUTIONARY THEORY,
AND THE ORIGINS OF RECIPROCITY 10 (2001) (concerning "fundamental aspects of human
nature, and ... the attempts by economists and other social scientists to identify its essen-
tial features and explore its implications"). Reciprocity that is not economically self-
serving at the individual level may be beneficial at the group level. Cf id. at 93-94;
ELLIOTT SOBER & DAVID SLOAN WILSON, UNTO OTHERS: THE EVOLUTION AND PSYCHOLOGY
OF UNSELFISH BEHAVIOR 6 (1998) (exploring "the concepts of altruism and selfishness in
evolutionary biology, psychology, and philosophy").
27. Social capital affects "the ability of people to work together for common purposes
in groups and organizations." FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 10. "The ability to associate de-
pends, in turn, on the degree to which communities share norms and values.... Out of
such shared values comes trust, and trust... has a large and measurable economic
value." Id.; see also James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital,
94 AM. J. SOC. S95, S104-05, S116-17 (Supp. 1988).
28. See generally FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 295-306 (discussing levels of trust
within several American ethnic groups).
29. LEE GARDENSWARTZ & ANITA ROWE, DIVERSE TEAMS AT WORK: CAPITALIZING ON
THE POWER OF DIVERSITY 63 (2003); see also GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF
PREJUDICE 4, 19 (1954); Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, The Limits of Reciprocity for Social
Cooperation 22 (2003), at http://www.law.gmu.edu/faculty/papers/docs/03-08.pdf (last vis-
ited Apr. 2, 2005) (stating that "behavioral patterns of reciprocity tend to emerge in close-
knit environments with homogeneous players, but do not thrive in highly heterogeneous
groups").
30. Nancy Wartik, Hard-Wired for Prejudice? Experts Examine Human Response to
2005] 1005
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
others as similar or different, however, is influenced by one's so-
ciety: distinctions of clan, tribe, nationality, race, and religion
may or may not be considered to render another person too differ-
ent to be trusted. Social trust can also arise, though, from "the es-
tablishment of a civic consciousness, that is, on strong evalua-
tions based on a shared tradition of civic engagement."31
Group identity is not always firmly fixed and may even "be
transiently delineated through a flip of a coin."32 Thus in a gym
class students will work hard for their team to beat the other
team, even when teams are picked at random. Cooperation is also
influenced by authority. Thus participants in experimental games
are more cooperative if the organizers tell them to be So.33 Some-
times an industry is dominated by one group partly because of
high levels of trust among members of the group.34 Subgroup co-
hesion, however, can either enhance or undermine solidarity in
the broader society.35
Some techniques for creating trust and empathy are matters of
common sense. To befriend a new neighbor it is self-evident that
one should be friendly, look for common interests, show trust in
the neighbor (as by lending a tool or utensil), and cooperate in
solving mutual problems. The task is more difficult when the par-
ties are diverse, especially if there is a history of distrust between
them.36 Methods have been identified to nurture trust and empa-
thy in difficult situations ranging from troubled marriages to
strategic alliances between businesses from different industries
or nations.
Trust is influenced by the "amalgam of signals we receive about
such matters as what other people expect, what other people need,
and what other people are likely to do."37 We have more trust in
Outsiders, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2004, at F5 (reporting on conclusions of recent studies
linking prejudice with evolution).
31. ADAM B. SELIGMAN, THE PROBLEM OF TRUST 78 (1997).
32. Sally, supra note 21, at 68.
33. "[P]articipants appear to follow instructions ordering them to cooperate or to com-
pete." Id. at 78. This is "slightly bewildering to an economist, because the instruction to
cooperate does not change the stated payoffs of the game." Id.
34. See Donald McCloskey, Bourgeois Virtue, AM. SCHOLAR, Spring 1994, at 177, 183-
84 (explaining that exchange is often focused within an ethnic group because of trust).
35. See FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 159 (stating that "[working] class solidarity deep-
ens the divisions between management and labor in Britain").
36. See id. at 295-96.
37. Stout, supra note 6, at 13.
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those who share our values.3" Trust inspires trust; we tend to
trust people we perceive to be trusting, but "[s]ignals of mistrust
breed mistrust."39 Similarly, "if people receive signals that they
are not trusted, they are likely to become less trustworthy." ° We
trust those whom we know from experience to be trustworthy.1
Trust builds slowly but erodes quickly. Once mistrust
emerges it is difficult to reverse:
[Mistrust tends to feed upon itself even more than trust does.
(Mis)trust by X tends to engender (mis)trust on the part of Y, which
justifies and deepens X's (mis)trust. While trust can be falsified be-
cause it leads to reliance on others that can be disappointed, mis-
trust cannot, because it blocks trusting action that might disprove
it.
4 3
People can work consciously to create mutual trust." Trust
grows with familiarity, so people can build trust just by socializ-
ing. 5 Communications of good will increase cooperation. 6 Being
friendly, however, complicates exchange relationships. Each
party has an incentive to bargain hard for favorable terms. Thus
in negotiating a sale-of a car, a house, or a business-each side
usually seeks the best terms for itself and neither may care what
38. "As a general rule, trust arises when a community shares a set of moral values in
such a way as to create expectations of regular and honest behavior." FUKUYAMA, supra
note 4, at 153; see supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
39. Tamar Frankel, Trusting and Non-Trusting on the Internet, 81 B.U. L. REV. 457,
459 (2001). "People who distrust the motives of others tend to have more rigid and narrow
expectations and to provoke the very reactions they fear." John G. Holmes & John K.
Rempel, Trust in Close Relationships, in CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS 187, 190 (Clyde Hendrick
ed., 1989). Conversely, "those who are more willing to trust other people are likely to be
equally trustworthy in that they are less likely to lie, cheat, or steal." David Good, Indi-
viduals, Interpersonal Relations, and Trust, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING
COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 3, 32 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988).
40. Tamar Frankel & Wendy J. Gordon, Introduction, 81 B.U. L. REV. 321, 322 (2001).
41. See Thomas Gautschi, History Effects in Social Dilemma Situations, 12 RATION-
ALITY & SoC'y 131, 132 (2000); EUGENE BARDACH, GETTING AGENCIES TO WORK
TOGETHER: THE PRACTICE AND THEORY OF MANAGERIAL CRAFTSMANSHIP 256 (1998); see
JUDITH INNES ET AL., COORDINATING GROWTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
THROUGH CONSENSUS BUILDING x (1994).
42. See NOOTEBOOM, supra note 24, at 2.
43. Id. at 89. This effect operates on groups as well as individuals. See Dan M. Kahan,
The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71, 72
(2003) (referring to a "self-sustaining atmosphere of distrust").
44. See LEWIS, supra note 11, at 3-18 (discussing ways to build trust).
45. See BARDACH, supra note 41, at 256-59 (stating that familiarity usually enhances
trust).
46. See Sally, supra note 21, at 69, 80, 83.
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the other thinks of it after the deal closes.47 In such cases aggres-
sive negotiating tactics-stating extreme demands, belittling the
other side's concerns and requests, insistence on one's legal
rights, fighting tooth and nail on many issues, and making
threats-are considered profitable.4" This is especially so for law-
yers, who are trained to treat litigation as the paradigm for inter-
action.49 A reputation for pugnacity is often an asset; it encour-
ages the other side to lower its expectations.5 °
When parties must cooperate, these tactics can backfire. 51 Even
if they reach agreement, they will distrust each other. Each side
must then spend more time and effort to monitor the other than it
would if they trusted each other. Each will press its legal rights to
the limit and contribute only what it must in order to avoid sanc-
tions that would cost more than the effort needed to avoid the
sanctions.2 This is especially true if one side considers the agree-
ment unfair. In handling the unforeseen problems that plague all
complex transactions the parties will fail utterly to make mutu-
ally beneficial adjustments or, at best, will need difficult, expen-
sive negotiations to make such adjustments.53 In short, the rela-
tionship each party will gain is less than it could have had with
trust and cooperation.
It is difficult to strike the perfect balance between pursuing
one's own interests and promoting trust. One can be too trusting
and concede too much. On the other hand, it is tempting for a
stronger party to impose a one-sided bargain on the weaker. That
ploy can be self-defeating, however, because it provokes resent-
ment in the weaker party, who may retaliate when performing
under the agreement, even at cost to itself.54
47. But see LEWIS, supra note 11, at 40-41.
48. Id.
49. See George W. Dent, Jr., Lawyers and Trust in Business Alliances, 58 BUS. LAW.
45, 53, 58-59 (2002).
50. Id. at 58.
51. "Pressing the other firm to retreat, or making implied threats, lowers people's en-
thusiasm and causes them to withhold information and protect their interests." LEWIS,
supra note 11, at 45; see also Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Foreword: Business
Lawyers and Value Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1995) (calling the desire
of each side to maximize its own profit a pitfall in bargaining).
52. LEWIS, supra note 11, at 44-45.
53. See id. at 39-40.
54. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing the tendency to retaliate).
Japanese firms often negotiate to build trusting relationships, not to gain one-sided terms.
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There are methods for building trust without sacrificing vital
interests. People more readily accept plans that they have helped
to create;55 they are less cooperative if they feel disrespected. 56 It
helps if each party determines which terms of the relationship
are vital to it and is flexible on matters of less importance.57 It
also helps for each party to explain why it needs a particular
term; trust erodes when one side cannot understand the demands
of the other.5" It helps if parties freely share information. Trust
grows when each side feels it is fully informed and that the other
does not conceal information. Each side can earn trust by propos-
ing solutions that expand the total pie so that both sides are win-
ners.
59
Since we trust those who share our values, each side can show
the other its commitment to certain values.60 Trustworthiness
and commitment to shared norms can be attested by third par-
ties. We have greater trust in a new restaurant if it has received
good reviews. Many individuals, businesses, and organizations
work hard to build and maintain good reputations because they
know that reputation is a basis for trust.6' The best basis for
trust, is that in past dealings another has vindicated our trust.
See Darin Bifani, Win the Battle or Build a Relationship?, How Japanese Style Could Help
American Negotiators, BUS. LAW TODAY, May/June 2003, at 25-26.
55. See Kahan, supra note 43, at 20.
56. See Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social Regu-
lation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 361, 369, 384, 389 (2001).
57. See generally id.
58. See Joel Brockner & Phyllis Siegel, Understanding the Interaction Between Proce-
dural and Distributive Justice: The Role of Trust, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS
OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 390, 391 (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996)
[hereinafter TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS] (discussing interorganizational trust). "[Piroced-
ural justice positively influences trust." Id. at 402.
59. Margaret A. Neale & Max H. Bazerman, Perspectives for Understanding Negotia-
tion: Viewing Negotiation as a Judgmental Process, 29 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 33, 40 (1985)
(calling this approach "integrative bargaining"); see also JAMES C. FREUND, SMART
NEGOTIATING: HOW TO MAKE GOOD DEALS IN THE REAL WORLD 21-22 (1992).
60. See Jorg Sydow, Understanding the Constitution of Interorganizational Trust, in
TRUST WITHIN AND BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES AND EMPIRICAL
APPLICATIONS 31, 38 (Christel Lane & Reinhard Bachmann eds., 1998) (referring to build-
ing trust by the "signalling of shared assumptions and understandings at the very begin-
ning. Competence, benevolence, and integrity, which are assumed to be important antece-
dents of trustworthiness on an interpersonal level.., should have a similar effect at the
interorganizational level, as long as those characteristics are attributed to the organiza-
tion.., in question").
61. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1745-62
(2001) (discussing the importance of commercial reputation in building trust in the cotton
industry).
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By definition, though, trust entails risk. Therefore, in extending
trust, people tend "to proceed in small steps that yield little
risk."62 "As partners fulfill their exchange obligations, cooperation
rises to higher levels."63
Trust can exist between organizations as well as individuals.'
Thus a company engaged in or exploring a joint venture can earn
the trust of another firm by showing its commitment to honesty,
openness, cooperation, fulfillment of promises, and such; in short,
by the same methods by which one individual earns the trust of
another. Trust can also extend to more amorphous institutions
like government or securities markets.65 Those who trust gov-
ernment to be honest and fair are less likely to resist its acts or to
violate the law than are those who do not trust government.66
Behavior and attitudes that build trust-friendliness, open-
ness, flexibility, and generosity-do not come naturally to many
people, especially where there is already conflict and mistrust be-
tween the parties. Again, this is natural because trust entails
making oneself vulnerable and hence is dangerous. Natural selec-
tion weeds out those who trust too much.
62. NOOTEBOOM, supra note 24, at 90. Initially, the parties may employ "safeguards,"
such as "contracts, supervision, dependence, hostages [and] reputation." Id. As trust
grows, these safeguards may be dropped.
63. Rachel E. Kranton, The Formation of Cooperative Relationships, 12 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 214, 227 (1996); see also Walter W. Powell, Trust-Based Forms of Governance, in
TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 58, at 51, 60 ("The process is iterative-the level of
cooperation increases with each agreement between the same partners. ").
64. See generally TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 58; TRUST WITHIN AND
BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES AND EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS (Christel
Lane & Reinhard Bachmann eds., 1998) (compiling discussions of conceptional issues and
theories of interorganizational trust).
65. See PIOTR SZTOMPKA, TRUST: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 43-44 (1999) (discussing
"trust directed at institutions and organizations"); Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence
Game, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 407, 426-30 (2002) (discussing trust behavior in the stock mar-
ket).
66. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 170, 178 (1990). Several studies
examine this phenomenon with regard to the siting of hazardous waste facilities. See
Robin Gregory et al., Incentives Policies to Site Hazardous Waste Facilities, 11 RISK
ANALYSIS 667, 672 (1991); Howard Kunreuther et al., Public Attitudes Toward Siting a
High-Level Nuclear Waste Repository in Nevada, 10 RISK ANALYSIS 469, 480 (1990); How-
ard Kunreuther & Doug Easterling, The Role of Compensation in Siting Hazardous Facili-
ties, 15 J. POLY ANALYSIS & MGMT. 601, 601-05 (1996).
67. See SOBER & WILSON, supra note 26, at 3.
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B. Altruism
People have a tendency to act altruistically, that is, with an in-
clination to help those who need help even if no equal material
consideration is expected in return. This tendency, too, varies
among individuals and among cultures and depends heavily on
context. People are more generous to those they consider to be
like themselves.6" Although by definition altruism precludes ma-
terial reciprocation, donors generally expect gratitude. Most want
recipients to be deserving in that their needs cannot be met by
their own efforts and do not stem from their own misconduct.69
They also want recipients to make good use of help received.7 °
However, altruistic inclinations are diminished by "undue pres-
sure or manipulativeness on the part of the person seeking
help." 1
Altruism is also affected by the conduct of other potential do-
nors. People want others who are able to donate to do so, to make
an equal sacrifice; many people are altruistic if others pitch in,
but not if they think others are free-riding-that is, sharing the
benefit that accrues to all society from help to the needy while re-
fusing to contribute themselves.72
68. See Harvey A. Hornstein, The Influence of Social Models on Helping, in ALTRUISM
AND HELPING BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF SOME ANTECEDENTS AND
CONSEQUENCES 29, 31-36 (J. Macaulay & L. Berkowitz eds., 1970) (presenting study
showing that altruism is more likely to the extent that there is a similarity or relationship
between the potential donor and donee).
69. See Leonard Berkowitz, Social Norms, Feelings, and Other Factors Affecting Help-
ing and Altruism, in 6 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 63, 104 (Leonard
Berkowitz ed., 1972) ("People are much more willing to aid someone requiring assistance
because of factors beyond his control than a person whose dependency is his own fault.").
70. See NANCY EISENBERG, ALTRUISTIC EMOTION, COGNITION, AND BEHAVIOR 198-99
(1986) (stating that expected utility influences altruism); Shalom H. Schwartz & Judith A.
Howard, Internalized Values as Motivators of Altruism, in DEVELOPMENT AND
MAINTENANCE OF PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE
MORALITY 229, 236 (Ervin Staub et al. eds., 1984) (stating that altruistic behavior is less
likely when potential donors believe that help "would not be effective").
71. Shalom H. Schwartz, Normative Influences on Altruism, in 10 ADVANCES IN EX-
PERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 221, 264 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1977); Berkowitz, su-
pra note 69, at 105 (discussing a study showing college students more likely to help some-
one in need if they felt free to refuse aid than if they felt compelled to help).
72. See EDWARD 0. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY: THE NEW SYNTHESIS 114, 120-21 (2000);
Dawes, Social Dilemmas, supra note 21, at 182-88 (reviewing many studies finding that
people are more likely to cooperate if they think others will cooperate); Robert L. Trivers,
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 35, 35-39, 45-54 (1971).
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C. Law and Norms
Like social scientists, legal scholars long assumed that people
are selfish;73 hence the law need only provide the right material
incentives in order to induce desired behavior. Although material
incentives matter and are often potent, they are not the sole de-
terminants of behavior. People often act against their own best
interests. They eat unhealthful diets and, of greater significance
to the law, many people repeatedly commit crimes even though
the odds of eventually being caught and suffering severe penalties
(both legal and social) are very high. Thus material incentives
created by law may have little effect. Severity of penalties, for ex-
ample, has little impact on the amount of street crimes.74
Societies must often rely on obedience to the law by most citi-
zens even when it is not in their interest to obey. For example, for
many kinds of tax cheating the risk of being caught is low. The
law must depend on voluntary compliance because it is too costly
to audit more than a small percentage of tax returns. 75 Finally, in
order to thrive, society, especially a democracy, needs far more
civic activism than is induced by self-interest. Even the minimal
civic act of voting is not in a citizen's self-interest; since the odds
are small that one vote will alter the result of an election, the ef-
fort required to vote exceeds the likely benefit. A fortiori, it does
not serve one's self-interest to undertake civic or charitable ac-
tivities.
Material incentives can even backfire. A person inclined to act
out of altruism may come to view the act in terms of self-interest
if offered a reward for so doing. She may then find the incentive
too small and decide not to act. 76 Also, many people act altruisti-
73. See WILSON, supra note 72, at 117-18.
74. Cf. Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-
First Century, in 23 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1, 21 (Michael Tonry ed.,
1998) (explaining that people do not perceive social and economic costs of punishment to
be strictly proportional to punishment received).
75. See Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical
Analysis, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 323, 334 (1972); FRANK A. COWELL, CHEATING THE
GOVERNMENT: THE ECONOMICS OF EVASION 73-74 (1990); Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin,
The Criminal Deterrence Literature: Implications for Research on Taxpayer Compliance, in
2 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 126, 142 (Jeffrey A. Roth & John
T. Scholz eds., 1989).
76. As stated by Professor Kahan:
The simple existence of an incentive scheme can be seen as a cue that other
individuals are not inclined to cooperate voluntarily .... This inference can
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cally if others do likewise.77 One who learns that others are being
paid for their civic efforts may demand equal pay or simply drop
the activity despite an offer of pay. Coercion can also backfire.
People who are inclined to act voluntarily may become resentful
and refuse to perform an act if told that they are required to do
it." "It would be a mistake, though, to conclude that material in-
centives invariably diminish trust .... [Tihe situation will likely
be different if individuals start out with the belief that most other
individuals are inclined to shirk or free-ride. In that case, the ad-
vent of a credible reward or penalty can work. . . ."" Thus the ef-
fect of incentives varies with context.
Voluntary civic activity and compliance with law therefore de-
pend not only on material incentives but on norms. Recently
"[l]egal scholars have rediscovered social norms.""° There must be
"a cultural infrastructure of social norms, learned dispositions to
respect property and keep promises and pay taxes and refrain
from private violence to settle disputes, and of a certain degree of
mutual trust-confidence that others will, within limits, for the
most part, also respect the norms.""
Norms operate in two ways.
One is that individuals have internal incentives... namely, they will
feel virtuous if they adhere to them, and experience guilt if they do
in turn trigger a reciprocal disposition to withhold voluntary cooperation ....
In addition, the existence of incentives can mask voluntary contributions to
public goods, thereby diluting the power of such contributions to trigger re-
ciprocal cooperation. Relatedly, incentives can crowd out dispositions such as
altruism by extinguishing the opportunity of individuals to demonstrate (to
themselves and to others) that they are willing to sacrifice material gain for
the public good.
Kahan, supra note 43, at 76-77.
77. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
78. People respond more positively when they are treated "in a civil rather than a co-
ercive fashion." Dan M. Kahan, A Colloquium on Community Policing: Reciprocity, Collec-
tive Action, and Community Policing, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 1513, 1525 (2002). Coercion "actu-
ally undermines the incentive that individuals have to collaborate with each other." Id. at
1526.
79. Kahan, supra note 43, at 77.
80. AMITAI ETZIONI, THE MONOCHROME SOCIETY 163 (2001). For further relevant lit-
erature, see id. at 285-86 n.2.
81. Robert W. Gordon, Why Lawyers Can't Just Be Hired Guns, in ETHICS IN
PRACTICE: LAWYERS' ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 42, 44 (Deborah L.
Rhode ed., 2000). Similarly "a social order based on laws can be maintained without mas-
sive coercion only if most people most of the time abide, as a result of supportive social
norms, by the social tenets embedded in the law." ETZIONI, supra note 80, at 171. For fur-
ther discussion on the intersection of law and morals, see id, at 155-59.
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not. Second, individuals have external incentives to obey moral no-
tions in that they will be praised by others for that behavior and ad-
monished, scolded, or otherwise punished for immoral behavior.
8 2
Norms are shaped by many forces, such as family, neighbor-
hood, and religion. Law and government are less decisive but do
play a role, especially in the long term. Material incentives mat-
ter 8 so taxing or penalizing certain acts tends to reduce their fre-
quency, while conduct that is subsidized tends to increase. Again,
however, material incentives sometimes backfire.
Government also shapes norms through education. Opposition
to moral education in public schools is waning now, partly be-
cause of the realization that all education promotes some norms.'
In addition to formal schooling, government educates through
publicity, as by giving or requiring consumer goods to disclose
health and nutrition information. Since trust and altruism tend
to be reciprocated, government can encourage these traits by pub-
licity. 5 Publicity is important not only because citizens lack in-
formation but also because in processing information "people rely
on a limited number of heuristic principles" that can "lead to se-
vere and systematic errors." 6 For example, "[p]eople care about
fairness, but their judgments about fairness are systematically
biased in their own direction.""
Finally, government influences norms through the expressive
function of law. As well as providing material incentives, law is
an expression of authority that most people respect.88 Despite
82. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 604 (2004). For
more information on social norms, see Richard H. McAdams & Eric B. Rasmusen, Norms
in Law and Economics, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavell eds., forthcoming 2005) (discussing social utility of guilt, esteem, and
shame).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79.
84. "A major goal of education.., is to foster internalization of social norms by chil-
dren and thus to affect their preferences." ETZIONI, supra note 80, at 176. "Public schools
typically foster, despite recent tendencies to deny this fact, a long list of values .... " Id. at
196.
85. See Kahan, supra note 43, at 102 (stating that government can encourage Good
Samaratanism "through public commendations of individuals who engage in heroic behav-
ior").
86. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974).
87. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, HAZARDOUS HEURISTICS 21 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., Pub. Law
and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 33, 2002), at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academ
ics/publiclaw/resources/33.crs.hazardous.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
88. See Chris Guthrie, Insights from Cognitive Psychology, 54 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 42, 45
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wide skepticism about politics in America now, there is an "in-
creasing tendency to look to law as an expression and carrier of
the few values that are widely shared in our society." 9 Many bat-
tles are fought over the symbolism of law. Thus there was fierce
debate over the constitutionality and fairness of criminal sodomy
laws even though they were rarely enforced in the few states that
had them. ° Both sides cared about these laws because of their
moral condemnation of homosexual acts.9 Many legislative reso-
lutions are declarations with no practical effect and are sought by
some group solely for symbolic purposes.
The impact of law on norms is negligible when it clashes with
deeply ingrained attitudes. When people are conflicted over com-
peting values, though, law can be influential. People are also af-
fected by the attitudes of those they consider their peers. When
the law promotes norms embraced by many citizens, the two to-
gether can alter the attitudes (or at least the behavior) of dissent-
ers.92 When law takes one side on an issue on which many citi-
zens are ambivalent, it can precipitate "norm cascades" in which
social consensus changes rapidly.93
If conditions are not ripe for a norm cascade, the expressive use
of law may help to create such conditions. If broad support for a
norm is lacking, attempts to establish that norm by coercion may
be frustrated: "police grow more reluctant to arrest, prosecutors
to charge, juries to convict, and judges to punish."94 This problem
can be avoided if lawmakers apply "gentle nudges" rather than
(2004) (stating that "we tend to defer to those whom we perceive to be authority figures").
89. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 3 (1991). See generally McAdams & Rasmusen, supra note 82 (describing how
law can intentionally or unintentionally undermine, facilitate, create, or perpetuate norms
including reciprocity).
90. See generally Christopher R. Leslie, Lawrence v. Texas as the Perfect Storm, 38
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 509, 511-16 (2005).
91. Id.
92. See SHAVELL, supra note 82, at 618 (stating that the law can lend authority to
norms expressed by private individuals and groups).
93. See Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 757, 759 (2003)
(reviewing Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Thomas Gilovich
et al., eds. 2002)). Professor Kahan expresses the same idea in referring to "multiple equi-
libria punctuated by tipping points." Kahan, supra note 43, at 75 (emphasis added). That
is, an increase (or decrease) in the contributions of a few to collective goods can start a
"chain reaction" pushing the larger group over a tipping point, moving the group willing-
ness to contribute to a higher (or lower) equilibrium. Id. at 79.
94. Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Prob-
lem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 607-08 (2000).
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"hard shoves"95 to punish people more receptive to the desired
norm. Merely labeling an act as criminal may persuade people
that it is socially harmful.96 If that happens, lawmakers can then
make greater use of coercive law.
D. Law and Trust
Like the relationship between law and norms, the relationship
between law and trust is complicated. People inclined to cooper-
ate voluntarily may bridle if subjected to legal compulsion to do
so. Thus in business deals cooperation is often greater when par-
ties rely on informal understandings and good faith rather than
on enforcing detailed contracts to the letter.97 Because coercion
can backfire, legal scholars disagree about laws that mandate be-
havior to help others or impose liability for supposed misconduct
in relationships of trust. "Legalizing" a relationship may impair
its benefits by introducing fear of legal liability.98 It may also sup-
press some people's cooperative inclinations.99 Lack of legal re-
95. Id. at 608.
96. See JOHANNES ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 7-8 (1974) (discussing
the general effects of criminal punishment on society).
97. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
98. Fear of liability may deter a party from revealing information or admitting error
as a step toward reconciliation. Roy J. Lewicki & Barbara Benedict Bunker, Developing
and Maintaining Trust in Work Relationships, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 58,
at 114, 128-36 (discussing steps required to repair broken trust). For example, "[iut is
commonly accepted that some physicians try to avoid malpractice claims by practicing de-
fensive medicine, or physician behavior guided to reducing liability risk rather than what
physicians consider to be in the best interests of patients." Robert A. Bevenson et al.,
Medical Malpractice Liability Crisis Meets Markets: Stress in Unexpected Places, Issue
Brief No. 68, Center for Studying Health System Change, Sept. 2003, at http://www.
hschange.com/CONTENT/605/?topic=topicO3 (last visited Apr. 2, 2005). See Bryan A. Lang
& LiLan Ren, Medical Liability Insurance and Damage Caps: Getting Beyond Band Aids
to Substantive Systems Treatment to Improve Quality and Safety in Heathcare, 30 AM. J.L.
& MED. 501, 502 (2004) ("Limited insurance and potential liability has also led to defen-
sive medicine, in which providers try to avoid lawsuits by ordering tests, procedures, and
anything else that might help protect against liability."). The low standard of care for cor-
porate directors is often defended on the ground that a higher standard would make direc-
tors excessively cautious. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious
Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1663-70
(2001) (providing overview of duty of care).
99. See Bruno S. Frey, How Intrinsic Motivation Is Crowded Out and In, 6
RATIONALITY & Soc'Y 334 (1994); Bruno S. Frey, Institutions and Morale: The Crowding-
Out Effect, in ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION 437, 439-42 (Avner Ben-Ner &
Louis Putterman eds., 1998). Others argue that the expressive use of law can promote co-
operation. See Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens?: An Economic Analysis
of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1597-1600 (2000).
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course, however, may deter people from trusting others. In many
countries, for example, investment in public companies is low be-
cause law offers no relief to investors abused by breaches of
trust. 00
Similarly, there is debate whether the expansion of individual
rights in America during the 1960s and 1970s weakened "com-
munal institutions" that long inculcated important social
norms.10 ' Some think the rights revolution damaged America, in
part by diverting political issues to the courts and away from de-
mocratic institutions where negotiation, compromise, and coali-
tion-building bring disparate groups together and teach them to
cooperate.10'2 An excellent example is the debate over abortion. In
America, one side asserts the right to life of the unborn child,
while the other asserts the pregnant woman's right to control her
body.' 3 Both are absolute positions that preclude compromise
and lead to endless acrimony.'04 By contrast, in Europe the debate
remains in the political arena and has reached a broadly accepted
compromise without the hostility of the debate in America.105 In
relationships of trust and cooperation-good marriages, for in-
stance-people rarely press their legal rights and "the assertion
of rights is usually a sign of breakdown in a relationship."0 6
Critics of the obsession with rights advocate greater attention
to duties. 1 7 To the biblical question "Am I my brother's
keeper?,"'0° more and more Americans reply "Certainly not."
100. See Jennifer Tobin & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Foreign Direct Investment and the
Business Environment in Developing Countries: The Impact of Bilateral Investment Trea-
ties, *2 (Jan. 3, 2005), at http://www.law.nyu.edu/weileij/springO5/globalization/Rose-
AckermanFDIBITs.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
101. FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 315. "[Tlhe cumulative and unintended effect [of for-
bidding discrimination by private organizations] was for the state to become an enemy of
many communal institutions. Virtually all communities saw their authority weak-
ened... ." Id. Disgruntlement over America's obsession with rights is also common on the
far left. "IRlights are said to be alienating. They separate people from each other-'stay
away, I've got my rights'-rather than encouraging them to form close, respectful commu-
nities." RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION
24 (2001).
102. See GLENDON, supra note 89, at 76-89, 171 (discussing lack of responsibility dia-
logue).
103. See id. at 64-66.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 65.
106. Id. at 175.
107. In America, unlike other liberal democracies, "rights have an absolute character
that is not balanced or moderated by constitutional language outlining duties to the com-
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Modern liberal polities, in order to live up to their own professed ide-
als, require not only a citizenry that is prepared to accept some re-
sponsibility for the less fortunate, but citizens who are willing, so far
as is possible, to take responsibility for themselves and their depend-
ents. Conservatives tend to lament deficiencies in the latter area;
progressives, in the former. But neither finds in American public dis-
course a ready vocabulary to express these important (and insepara-
ble) concerns.1
0 9
III. RACE IN AMERICA TODAY
A. Distrust and Despair
Forty years ago most Americans were optimistic about race re-
lations. After World War II, court decisions and state and federal
statutes forbade most state-sponsored and much private dis-
crimination. Racial hostility appeared to be crumbling. It seemed
that racial inequality could be quickly narrowed and soon elimi-
nated.1" 0
There has been progress. Polls document changing attitudes
about race.111 African Americans now hold positions that many
blacks and whites thought whites would never have allowed.
Blacks have made economic progress both absolutely and relative
to whites.112 Unfortunately, progress has been small and slow.
munity or responsibilities to other people." FUKuYAMA, supra note 4, at 315.
108. Genesis 4:9.
109. GLENDON, supra note 89, at 105.
110. "In the heyday of the civil rights movement.., those who fought for racial equal-
ity were optimists, and that optimism seemed vindicated by events." BEYOND THE COLOR
LINE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND ETHNICITY IN AMERICA 2 (Abigail Thernstrom &
Stephan Thernstrom eds., 2002) [hereinafter BEYOND THE COLOR LINE].
111. In a 1995 poll, only thirty percent of blacks agreed that "the problems that most
blacks face are caused primarily by whites," and only twenty-five percent of blacks be-
lieved that "the most important step in improving race relations involve[d] 'white Ameri-
cans doing more to recognize and reduce racism by whites against blacks.'" Everett C.
Ladd, What Americans Think About Race and Ethnicity, in BEYOND THE COLOR LINE, su-
pra note 110, at 53, 56.
112. In a 1985 poll, sixty-six percent of blacks surveyed felt that as a group they were
"making progress" in America, although sixty-one percent of blacks in leadership positions
said the group was "going backwards." Martin Kilson, Problems of Black Politics: Some
Progress, Many Difficulties, DISSENT, Fall 1989, at 526, 527. See generally STEPHAN
THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE NATION,
INDISIBLE (1997); Finis Welch, Half Full or Half Empty? The Changing Economic Status
of African Americans, 1967-1996, in BEYOND THE COLOR LINE, supra note 110, at 181 (dis-
cussing how the status of African Americans has changed over the past thirty years in re-
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Even in the prosperous 1990s, while the economic status of blacks
rose, the gap with whites barely narrowed.'13 In some ways condi-
tions have worsened. Unemployment and illegitimacy rates, once
approximately equal by race, are now much higher for blacks.114 A
large number of blacks now seem to comprise an underclass, un-
connected to mainstream American society in school, work, or
residence." 5
Views diverge about what went wrong. Some consider the sec-
ond-class status of blacks immutable. Derrick Bell wrote,
Those who urge emigration would not be guilty of exaggeration were
they to argue as follows:
Black people will never gain full equality in this country. Even our
most successful efforts will produce no more than temporary "peaks of
progress." Given this unassailable truth, blacks need to acknowledge
the permanence of their subordinate status. 
116
In this view, whites get both material and psychological bene-
fits from repressing blacks." 7
If the permanence thesis is correct, it is worse than useless to
seek racial progress. Many social problems can be ameliorated; it
would be foolish or callous to waste resources on immutable ills.
It would also be pointless for blacks (especially the young) to pur-
gards to the labor market). In some categories blacks now earn more than whites with
equal credentials. See Abigail Thernstrom, The Racial Gap in Academic Achievement, in
BEYOND THE COLOR LINE, supra note 110, at 259, 261-62.
113. See Roger 0. Crockett & Peter Coy, Progress Without Parity, Bus. WK., July 14,
2003, at 100.
114. See SANDRA LUCKETT CLARK & MAI WEISMANTLE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
EMPLOYMENT STATUS: 2000, CENSUS 2000 BRIEF 5 (Aug. 2003) (showing 3.0% unemploy-
ment rate for whites and 6.9% for blacks).
115. See id.
116. DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 62 (3d ed. 1992).
117. See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF
RACISM 7-8 (1992) (discussing racial consciousness of whites); DELGADO & STEFANCIC, su-
pr note 101, at 7 (stating that "racism advances the interests of both white elites (mate-
rially) and working-class people (psychically)"); ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK
AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 60 (1992) (stating that "no white American,
including those who insist that opportunities exist for persons of every race, would change
places even with the most successful black American"). Such views are not uncommon.
"Pessimism is strikingly pervasive in civil rights circles today." BEYOND THE COLOR LINE,
supra note 110, at 2. This was not always the case. See supra note 110 and accompanying
text. Some whites do derive psychic satisfaction and material advantage from the inferior
status of blacks. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 3, at 1764 (stating that "race-based
employment decisions will not necessarily be motivated by racial animus but by an em-
ployer's interest in realizing the efficiency gains of homogeneity").
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sue education, hard work, and other middle class values that
bring success for other Americans. Indeed, if this path is blocked
by racism, it may make sense to adopt an oppositional culture
that flouts (white) middle class values, seeks solace in substance
abuse, and strikes back with crime.11 If the permanence thesis is
wrong, it is also counterproductive. "Poorly conceived allegations
of racial misconduct... spread harmful confusion."1 9 They may
dissuade people from undertaking beneficial action.
Some who do not necessarily embrace the permanence thesis
still reject a liberal approach to race problems because they con-
sider it rests on a "[m]istaken belief that sweeping social reform
can be accomplished through speech and incremental victories
within the system."12 ° In this view, "'[e]verything must change at
once,' otherwise the system merely swallows up the small im-
provement one has made, and everything remains the same."12" ' It
is hard to imagine, though, how everything in our society could
change at once, so this position also seems to lead to despair.
B. Reasons for Hope
Most Americans, black and white, reject the permanence the-
sis. Since race is so sensitive an issue, helpful objectivity can be
gained by comparing other protracted group conflicts. For centu-
ries France and Germany fought wars that cost millions of
lives. "'22 This hostility seemed permanent, but within a few years
after World War II, the two were military allies and partners in
an economic union that brought unprecedented prosperity to
both. "'23 This development is not unique or even unusual. As one
more example, Protestants and Catholics slaughtered each other
118. See infra notes 157-63 and accompanying text (discussing the "oppositional cul-
ture").
119. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 8 (1997).
120. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 101, at 146 (calling this belief the "empathic
fallacy").
121. Id. at 57.
122. See John Norton Moore, Beyond the Democratic Peace: Solving the War Puzzle, 44
VA. J. INT'L L. 341, 428 (2004).
123. See, e.g., Frans B.M. de Waal, Evolutionary Ethics, Aggression, and Violence: Les-
sons from Primate Research, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 18, 20 (2004).
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for centuries. 124 Today, few even know what these wars were
about.
Group hostility ends when each side realizes that it loses from
conflict and can gain from cooperation. 125 That realization, how-
ever, comes less from changing individual minds than from
changes of generations; a generation committed to endless combat
dies off and is succeeded by a generation that sees the futility of
strife and the promise of collaboration. This evolution often takes
longer than a single generation, and how long it takes depends
largely on the wisdom of the leaders of each group.
Progress is slow because people do not naturally see the bene-
fits of cooperation; it is an acquired taste. An old joke tells of a
genie who promises to grant a Russian peasant his greatest wish.
The peasant does not hesitate; he knows just what he wants-the
death of his neighbor's cow. Much of the world still thinks like
that, which is why so many group conflicts persist. Conciliation is
also blocked by the machinations of those who profit from contin-
ued conflict. In Europe's religious wars, for example, many eccle-
siastics and soldiers on both sides gained position, power, and
prestige from the strife. 126
Martin Luther King, Jr. understood the importance of coopera-
tion.1 27 Most white Americans now realize that discrimination
against blacks is not only harmful to blacks, and unjust, but also
damages whites. Whites in the old Confederacy were not the rich-
est white Americans, but the poorest. 12 Since the end of segrega-
124. See Daniel Philpott, Religious Freedom and the Undoing of the Westphalian State,
25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 981, 981 (2004).
125. See infra text accompanying note 284.
126. 1 Leonardo Bruni, Introduction to HISTORY OF THE FLORENTINE PEOPLE x (James
Hankins ed., Harvard Univ. Press 2001).
127. He said: "We must all learn to live together as brothers. Or we will all perish to-
gether as fools. We are tied together in the single garment of destiny, caught in an ines-
capable network of mutuality." Martin Luther King, Jr., Remaining Awake Through a
Great Revolution, Sermon at the National Cathedral (Mar. 31, 1968), in A KNOCK AT
MIDNIGHT: INSPIRATION FROM THE GREAT SERMONS OF REVEREND MARTIN LUTHER KING,
JR. (Clayborne Carson & Peter Holloran eds., 1998). Derrick Bell agrees that whites will
allow black progress when there is a convergence of the interests of both, but he mistak-
enly believes that such occasions are rare. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980); Derrick A.
Bell, Jr., California's Proposition 209: A Temporary Diversion on the Road to Racial Disas-
ter, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1447, 1452 (1997).
128. See Staige Blackford, One Man's South, 44 EMORY L.J. 847, 848-49 (1995) (dis-
cussing inferior conditions of southern states as compared to their northern neighbors in
the nineteenth century).
2005] 1021
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
tion, the condition of Southern whites compared to other white
Americans has not deteriorated but improved. Skilled, produc-
tive, and prosperous blacks who are integrated into the American
economy and society compete with whites for desirable jobs, but
they are a much greater asset to the nation than they are as a
downtrodden minority.
Blacks can gain even more than whites from cooperation.
White Americans alone are numerous and wealthy enough to
comprise a market large enough to be efficient. Further, many
white-owned American firms operate in global markets, which in-
creases opportunities for profitable exchange. The African-
American market by itself is too small to be efficient in most in-
dustries and is not well integrated into global markets. 2 9
Although African Americans have made economic progress in
recent decades, that progress may not accelerate, and may even
slow further, unless race relations improve. The ethnic profile of
America is changing; Hispanics now outnumber blacks as Amer-
ica's largest minority. 130 Perhaps blacks can increase their eco-
nomic and political power by coalescing with other, growing mi-
nority groups. The interests of minority groups, however, are not
all the same. For instance, racial preferences for blacks in univer-
sity admissions harms Asian Americans.13 Further, where the
situations of various minorities are similar, they may compete for
benefits rather than cooperate. 32 Because of competition from
129. See generally e. christi cunningham, Identity Markets, 45 HOw. L.J. 491 (2002)
(describing "identity markets" based on race and the detrimental effects on black workers
and the perception of black workers).
130. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Hispanic Population Reaches All-Time High
of 38.8 Million, New Census Bureau Estimates Show (June 18, 2003), available at
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/hispanic-origin-population
/001130.html. (last visited Apr. 2, 2005); see also Haya El Nasser, 39 Million Make His-
panics Largest U.S. Minority Group, USA TODAY, June 19, 2003, at Al.
131. See Linda Chavez, Promoting Racial Harmony, in THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
DEBATE 314, 320 (George E. Curry ed., 1996) (citing a University of California report stat-
ing "Asian-American admissions would increase by 15 to 25% if the university based its
decisions on academics and socioeconomic status but not race"); Peter H. Schuck, Affirma-
tive Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 68 (2002) ("Increasingly,
affirmative action in effect punishes the stunning academic and economic achievements of
many Asians by excluding them, like whites, from eligibility for preferences.").
132. See NICOLAS C. VACA, THE PRESUMED ALLIANCE: THE UNSPOKEN CONFLICT
BETWEEN LATINOS AND BLACKS AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR AMERICA 11-12 (2004); MARK R.
WARREN, DRY BONES RATTLING: COMMUNITY BUILDING TO REVITALIZE AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 27 (2001) (documenting frequent political competition between blacks and
other minority groups).
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immigrant workers, for example, blacks have fled regions of high
immigration.133 The growing number and variety of ethnic minori-
ties in America may dilute the empathy of whites for African
Americans.
Current demographic trends reinforce a national ideological
shift toward social libertarianism and economic conservatism. Al-
though racial preferences in hiring and admissions for blacks and
some other minorities are common, antipoverty programs are out
of fashion in both political parties. Thus it was a Democratic
president, Bill Clinton, who declared an end to "welfare as we
know it."'34 While social welfare spending has increased for pro-
grams like drug benefits for the elderly that benefit the broad
middle class,3 5 they do not particularly aid blacks, especially poor
blacks.'36 To the extent that whites acknowledge any debt to
blacks, they are likely to feel that this debt is being discharged by
racial preferences in employment and school admissions and mi-
nority set-asides for government contracts. These programs, too,
confer little benefit on the poor.
In sum, the neglect of race relations is not benign for blacks.
Progress toward racial equality will require special efforts entail-
ing increased trust and cooperation between the races.
133. See Steven A. Holmes, Immigration Fueling Cities' Strong Growth, Data Show,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1998, at A10 (noting "debate over whether increased competition for
jobs in areas where immigrants have clustered is pushing out people who are already liv-
ing there, or whether those who depart would have left anyway, lured by better economic
prospects elsewhere"); Kenneth B. Noble, Blacks Say Life in Los Angeles Is Losing Allure,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995, at Al (reporting emigration of blacks from Los Angeles to
neighboring counties and out of state and movement of Hispanics into formerly black
neighborhoods). Many employers prefer immigrant workers to African Americans. "Em-
ployers perceive a stronger work ethic among immigrants of all racial groups, and a
greater willingness to accept and retain low-wage jobs." Harry J. Holzer & Paul Offner,
The Puzzle of Black Male Unemployment, 154 PUB. INT. 74, 76 (2004).
134. Jason DeParle, The Clinton Welfare Bill: A Long, Stormy Journey, N.Y. TIMES,
July 15, 1994, at Al.
135. See Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
136. See, e.g., Robert Conot, Saul Alinsky Lives: Populist Groups Go Back to Basics,
Revive Poverty War, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1989, at 3.
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C. Sources of Mistrust
There is ample reason for racial mistrust in America. People
naturally fear those who differ from themselves, 137 so some racial
mistrust is probably instinctive. More important are the "history
effects ' 13 of slavery, Jim Crow segregation, discrimination and
charges of innate racial inferiority. Whites who have not contrib-
uted to this history are hurt if they are personally mistrusted;
they feel this mistrust is irrational. To make sense of the world,
however, all people use heuristic devices to place things in cate-
gories. 131 In other words, all people employ stereotypes. In cases
of group hostility, people distrust all members of the opposing
group.
In part, this is rational, even necessary. Even if one realizes
that most members of the other group are not dangerous, some of
the others are dangerous and one cannot tell which those are. The
costs of an injury (whether physical, financial, or emotional) from
mistaken trust usually exceed the benefits of mistaken mistrust.
Most people are risk averse, so mistrust of all members of the
other group is often an individually rational choice. People who
distrust another often construe ambiguous behavior to confirm
the distrust. An innocent glance may be construed as a hostile
glare or a lascivious leer. If a white waitress is rude to all cus-
tomers, a white customer will probably conclude that the waitress
is rude to everyone. A black customer, though, may assume that
the waitress is rude only to African Americans.
Stereotypes distort reasoning even if (perhaps especially if)
they are unconscious. 4 ° Stereotypes "undermine an observing
agent's ability to see ... [the stigmatized] as a person possessing
a common humanity with the observer-as 'someone not unlike
137. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
138. See Gautschi, supra note 41, at 132-33 (theorizing that "history effects" impact
people's choices about the future).
139. See DIANE ACKERMAN, AN ALCHEMY OF MIND: THE MARVEL AND MYSTERY OF THE
BRAIN 54-59 (2004) (describing how the human brain, in order to make sense of the world,
seeks patterns).
140. "Attitudes about stereotypic characteristics of groups of people can influence the
way we behave, without our having any awareness of this influence, or even of the atti-
tudes themselves." JANICE NADLER, FLOUTING THE LAW: DOES PERCEIVED INJUSTICE
PROVOKE GENERAL NON-COMPLIANCE? 24 (Northwestern School of Law, Law & Econ. Re-
search Paper No. 02-9, 2002), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
353745 (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
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the rest of us.""" Negative stereotypes create "stereotype threat,"
that is, fear and self-doubt that cause victims to perform less well
than they otherwise would when subject to scrutiny. 4 2 False
stereotypes can be corrected. Familiarity with members of an-
other group generally reduces negative attitudes about the
group.'43 For both blacks and whites, the more acquaintances
they have among the other race, the more likely they are to have
positive attitudes about that race. 44 Unfortunately, racial inte-
gration is uncommon in America today; perhaps even less com-
mon now than a few decades ago. Racial separation was initially
imposed by whites and to some extent still is, but is now often
chosen by blacks.
Racial separation is a cause as well as an effect of racial strife.
Same-group identity encourages people to cooperate; different-
group identity impairs cooperation.'45 "Multiculturalism," which
is so fashionable now, especially in academia, often has the latter
effect. Multiculturalism holds that people (at least nonwhites) de-
rive meaning and values from their cultural identity group-
typically an ethnic or religious group. 4 6 This causes social "frag-
mentation" 47 and "denial of the idea of a common culture and a
141. GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 67 (2002).
142. See generally id. at 17-54 (detailing how stereotypes affect the holder as well as
the object).
143. See C. DANIEL BATSON, THE ALTRUISM QUESTION: TOWARD A SOCIAL-PSYCHO-
LOGICAL ANSWER 218-19 (1991). Of course, those who begin with more positive attitudes
about the other race are likely to develop more acquaintances among its members, so cau-
sation runs both ways.
144. See id.
145. See Sally, supra note 21, at 68, 78.
146. For example, one major academic organization urged "the study of one's own par-
ticular inherited and constructed traditions [and] identity communities." ASS'N OF AMERI-
CAN COLL. AND UNIV., THE DRAMA OF DIVERSITY AND DEMOCRACY: HIGHER EDUCATION
AND AMERICAN COMMITMENTS xx-xxii (1995); see also Ramin Afshar-Mohajer & Evelyn
Sung, The Stigma of Inclusion: Racial Paternalism and Separatism in Higher Education,
TEX. EDUC. REV., Winter 2003-04, at
http://www.educationreview.homestead.com/2003stigma. html (last visited Mar. 29, 2005)
(describing various college programs that encourage minority students to cultivate a sepa-
rate ethnic identity). These programs not only divide minorities from whites but also frac-
ture minorities into smaller and smaller identity groups.
147. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON A
MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY 21 (rev. ed. 1998); see also SELIGMAN, supra note 31, at 155 (ar-
guing that multiculturalism points to "a reemergence of group identities" that are "con-
trary to those classic ideas of the individual that we associate with bourgeois political
forms and that were indeed essential to that mode of social organization"). "The problem
with multiculturalism as it is practiced in the American educational system is that its un-
derlying objective is not to understand but to validate the non-Western cultures of Amer-
ica's various ethnic and racial minorities." FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 320.
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single society." 4 ' Arthur Schlesinger wrote: "[w]atching ethnic
conflict tear one nation after another apart, one cannot look with
complacency at proposals to divide the United States into distinct
and immutable ethnic and racial communities, each taught to
cherish its own apartness from the rest.' 49
Expressions of despair like Professor Bell's become self-
fulfilling prophecies. 5 ° One who despairs does not bother to strive
for racial progress. Statements that racism is immutable also un-
dermine trust. If whites profit from racial discrimination, blacks
properly suspect that expressions of racial goodwill by whites are
tricks to divert black resistance or, at best, naive self-delusion.' 5 '
Such attitudes persuade John McWhorter that 'black America is
currently caught in certain ideological holding patterns'-chief
among them being the ideology of permanent victimhood-and
that these today are 'much more serious barriers to black well-
being than is white racism.""52 Again: "Mistrust tends to feed on
itself."'53
Racial hostility affects behavior in other ways. Some black
youth who think that paths to success open to others are closed to
them take alternate routes (like crime) or abandon hope and seek
solace in drugs.'54 Racial animus affects not only the choices peo-
ple have (or think they have) but also the values they weigh in
making choices. Again, those who think society treats them fairly
tend to accept and follow society's rules, even when they could
profit by breaking the rules; but those who feel abused often re-
taliate, even if they know retaliation will cost them.'55
148. SCHLESINGER, supra note 147, at 141.
149. Id. at 22; see also FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 272 (stating that "ethnic diversity
can be a serious obstacle to the development of a common culture").
150. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
151. Thus black parents teach their children "to be cynical, skeptical, and on guard to-
ward White people and White-controlled institutions, including the public schools, as well
as toward Black authorities in the system whom they regard as White representatives."
JOHN U. OGBU, BLACK AMERICAN STUDENTS IN AN AFFLUENT SUBURB: A STUDY OF
ACADEMIC DISENGAGEMENT 41 (2003). As a result, "students did not view their present
schooling as a preparation for their future .... Rarely did students make the connection
between their school career and what they wanted to be in adult life." Id. at 167.
152. John H. McWhorter, Still Losing the Race?, COMMENTARY, Feb. 2004, at 37.
153. See supra text accompanying note 43.
154. See OGBU, supra note 151, at 159-60.
155. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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Victims of stereotypes often respond in ways that confirm the
stereotype, thereby creating a "feedback loop."'56 Some blacks
have adopted an "oppositional culture" shaped by hostility to
white culture. 157 Many black students claim doing well in school
is "acting white."' This attitude helps explain why blacks do
worse than whites even when socio-economic differences are fac-
tored out.'59
Oppositional culture corrodes relations within the minority
group. Many blacks express admiration for black criminals as re-
bels against the white power structure. 6 ' Most victims of black
criminals, however, are themselves black, despite denunciation
by black leaders of black-on-black crime.' 6 ' This crime also sours
whites' attitudes toward blacks.'62 The oppositional culture is
profitable for some.'63
156. See LOURY, supra note 141, at 26-27, 105, 160; see also BAKARI KITWANA, THE HIP
HOP GENERATION: YOUNG BLACKS AND THE CRISIS IN AFRICAN AMERICAN CULTURE 137-40
(2002) (stating that the oppositional culture (including gangster rappers) glories in and
flaunts many black stereotypes).
157. For discussions of oppositional culture, see FREDRICK C. HARRIS, SOMETHING
WITHIN: RELIGION IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICAL ACTIVISM 133-53 (1999); YANICK ST.
JEAN & JOE R. FEAGIN, DOUBLE BURDEN: BLACK WOMEN AND EVERYDAY RACISM 36-39
(1998).
158. See OGBU, supra note 151, at 85. Professor Ogbu reported that nearly half the
black high school students interviewed in an affluent suburb believed that "highly edu-
cated Blacks and successful Black professionals in White establishments and institutions
gave up or abandoned their culture and racial identity." Id. at 206-07. They believed "[iut
was not cool to work hard in school or be academically engaged." Id. at 213. This view is
not limited to conservatives. See THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 24, 45-46 (Christo-
pher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998) (stating that black students will perform bet-
ter if their parents change the way they "deal with their children"); Bob Herbert, Breaking
Away, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2003, at A23 ("[Tihis perverse peer pressure to do less than
your best in scholarly and intellectual pursuits is holding back large numbers of black
Americans, especially black boys and men."). Black students perform better in schools that
require parents to support academic effort. See BEYOND THE COLOR LINE, supra note 110,
at 270 (reporting the experience of KIPP Academy in New York City).
159. See OGBU, supra note 151, at 34-36.
160. See KENNEDY, supra note 119, at 26-27 (referring to the popularity of criminals in
black culture); Regina Austin, "The Black Community" Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of
Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1776 (1992) (referring to "a subtle admiration of
criminals" among many blacks); Mark Naison, Outlaw Culture and Black Neighborhoods,
1 RECONSTRUCTION 128, 128-30 (1992) (explaining the "outlaw culture" that has devel-
oped among black youth).
161. See JEROME G. MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 38 (1996); see also John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Question of Black
Crime, 117 PUB. INT. 3, 7 (1994); Adam Walinsky, The Crisis of Public Order, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, July 1995, at 39, 47.
162. See Christopher A. Bracey, Thinking Race, Making Nation, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 911,
929 (2003) (reviewing GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY (2002))
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Resentment of another's success is common to humans, espe-
cially when the other resembles ourselves. A poor black may more
easily accept the success of whites, which seems to confirm racial
injustice, than the success of fellow blacks, which shows that suc-
cess for blacks is possible, so that those who fail should blame
themselves. Some black students who deprecate education pres-
sure other blacks to do likewise, a phenomenon called the crab-
bucket syndrome." Ironically, this practice mimics the racial re-
pression of the old South by punishing blacks who show any am-
bition or initiative. Some blacks also resent black entrepreneurs
and deny them patronage. This helps explain why black entre-
preneurs are often less successful in their own neighborhoods
than immigrant competitors.
Psychological damage to blacks helps to explain an apparent
paradox:
[Wihile whites complain that blacks are too race conscious, the Afri-
can-American problem has been, in a way, that blacks have never
been race conscious enough to stick together in tightly knit economic
organizations.... [T]here are not the same traditions of trust and
solidarity linking black merchants with their customers as in Amer-
ica's ethnic communities. Not only are blacks mistrusted by the sur-
rounding white community, but.., they mistrust one another. 166
Again, altruism thrives when benefactors feel that beneficiaries
are like themselves and deserve help because they act responsi-
("Nothing has proven more corrosive of modern American race relations than the per-
ceived link between blackness and rampant criminality.").
163. Today the protest identity is a career advantage for an entire generation of black
intellectuals, particularly academics who have been virtually forced to position themselves
in the path of their university's obsession with "diversity." Inflation from the moral au-
thority of protest, added to the racial-preference policies in so many American institutions,
provides an irresistible incentive for black America's best minds to continue defining
themselves by protest. Shelby Steele, The Age of White Guilt and the Disappearance of the
Black Individual, HARPER'S, Nov. 2002, at 33, 38. Black intellectuals who reject this iden-
tity risk the "fate of invisibility." Id.
164. See, e.g., Ron Suskind, Against All Odds: In Rough City Schools, Top Students
Struggle to Learn-and Escape, WALL ST. J., May 26, 1994, at Al (describing instances of
the syndrome).
165. "[Tjhe lack of a black entrepreneurial class has for long been a staple of the socio-
logical literature." FUKUJYAMA, supra note 4, at 297; see also Ezra W. Zuckerman, On Net-
works and Markets by Rauch and Casella, eds., 41 J. ECON. LITERATURE 545, 556 (2003)
(referring to "the well-known weakness of African American (retail) entrepreneurship
[that] may result in part from the absence of [ethnic] networks").
166. FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 295-96.
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bly.167 Separationism and the oppositional culture reduce the al-
truism of whites by making blacks more distant and different
from whites. Since altruism is contagious,16 declines in altruism
trigger a chain reaction. The downward spiral is fed by declara-
tions like Professor Bell's that racial progress is impossible be-
cause people are less altruistic if they think altruism can do no
good: "the greater the perceived benefit to others, the greater the
incidence of cooperation." 169
In the logic of the oppositional culture, victim status may be-
come a goal itself. Many cultures glorify victims; the veneration of
martyrs in Christianity and Islam is one example. 7 ° The multi-
culturalism now in fashion requires victim status, whether based
on race, gender, class, or sexual preference. Victim status seems
especially desirable when the alternative is mundane. Racial
equality for blacks means moving into middle class existence with
jobs like accounting, mowing the lawn, and paying the kids' den-
tistry bills. This type of lifestyle may seem unappealing, particu-
larly as contrasted with the heroic age of protest in the civil
rights movement.17' Thus, there is ambivalence about whether
equality is desirable.
There is also ambivalence about how to achieve equality. For a
disadvantaged group to commit to improve itself seems to concede
some fault for its problems. Even blacks who favor greater self-
help hesitate to say so for fear of abetting "blaming the victim."'72
The group may, therefore, insist that all concessions come from
the dominant group. This attitude seems to underlie demands of
some blacks for reparations.173 On the other hand, a "gift" of
equality does not restore honor.'74 To accept relief as charity be-
167. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
169. Stout, supra note 6, at 13.
170. Thus it is said that Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat "prefer[red] to play the victim
rather than the statesman." Thomas L. Friedman, Editorial, Arafat's War, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 13, 2000, at A33.
171. See KITWANA, supra note 156, at 153 (describing the effects of the civil rights
movement as "large and transformative").
172. See Risa E. Kaufman, The Cultural Meaning of the "Welfare Queen": Using State
Constitutions to Challenge Child Exclusions Provisions, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
301, 310 (1997).
173. See KITWANA, supra note 156, at 25-26 (stating that some black Americans' de-
sires for reparations are fueled by the lack of economic equality, even during a time of
American economic growth).
174. Bracey, supra note 162, at 934 ("As both Tocqueville and Patterson observed, the
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lies the claim that one is a victim and entitled to relief. To de-
mand relief as a right is coercive, however, and donors resist co-
ercion. Thus, a dispute about whether to label relief as charity or
reparations can thwart agreement even if the parties can settle
on the amount of relief.
Heuristic biases further complicate race relations. People want
to be fair but tend to favor themselves in gauging what is fair.
Thus people give themselves too much credit when they succeed
and too little blame when they fail,"'5 and they underestimate the
obstacles to success that others face. This bias abets the belief of
many whites that many blacks do not deserve help. Blacks may
overstate the obstacles they face and underestimate their ability
to overcome obstacles.
D. The Difficulty of Dialogue
When trust is deep, people can discuss and usually resolve dis-
putes. Mistrust feeds on itself, however, making it hard even to
discuss reconciliation. Because of the sad history of race relations
in America, discussions about race tend to be aggressive and ac-
rimonious, and lawyers tend to be among the most rigid and
dogmatic participants. Professor Burlette Carter believes:
[Whites] are often stunned by a guilt that they are not sure is their
own, but that they feel as deeply as if it were. And we [African
Americans] are left angry-at ourselves for expecting mutual vul-
nerability-and at them for, once again, we believe, shifting the fo-
cus of our comments from our pain to their guilt. And so the next
time... we simply say nothing at all.
176
Professor Carter also refers to "the impasse that African
Americans know exists between them and whites in public con-
versation, an impasse indicative of a larger life separation." 7 '
Ironically, the wealth of opportunities for mutually beneficial
racial cooperation is a problem. When both sides realize that the
bestowal of freedom and civil rights do little to restore honor.").
175. "People care about fairness, but their judgments about fairness are systematically
biased in their own direction." SUNSTEIN, supra note 87, at 21.
176. W. Burlette Carter, What's Love Got To Do with It? Race Relations and the Second
Great Commandment, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 133, 134 (Michael
W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001).
177. Id. at 135.
1030 [Vol. 39:1001
RACE, TRUST, ALTRUISM, AND RECIPROCITY
range between their reservation points (points beyond which an
agreement is not beneficial) is narrow, there is little to negotiate.
When the range is broad, though, each side may haggle endlessly
in pursuit of an agreement more favorable to itself and closer to
the other's reservation point. '
IV. THE UNCERTAIN GOALS
Deep trust is needed only for collaboration to pursue complex
goals. If there is no shared goal-if, say, the goal is only to avoid
interracial conflict-deep trust is unnecessary. Discussions of
race in America often assume an agreed goal, such as equality.
The meaning of equality is notoriously elastic, however.'79 As in
the famous case of the two ships called The Peerless,8 0 two people
may use the same word but mean very different things.
Acceptance of minorities by the majority in America is condi-
tioned on assimilation.' Assimilation entails acceptance of es-
tablished standards of conduct-speech, dress, and manners-
and of certain values associated with Protestantism. 1 2 Protes-
tants formed "the mold within which American culture as such
was cast in the nineteenth century, and other religious groups
like Catholics and Jews who had no experience of voluntaristic re-
ligion in Europe gradually came to share similar qualities ...
they assimilated the same value system.'
8 3
Assimilation allows some cultural distinctiveness; Italian
Americans did not have to abandon opera in order to be accepted
in America. In practice, however, group identity declines and of-
ten virtually vanishes. For example, except for a few innocuous
cultural festivals, there is no identifiable Scottish American or
178. See RUSSELL B. KOROBKIN & JONATHAN ZASLOFF, ROAD BLOCKS TO THE "ROAD
MAP": A NEGOTIATION THEORY PERSPECTIVE ON THE PAST FAILURE AND FUTURE
PROSPECTS OF "LAND FOR PEACE" 38 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No.
04-4, 2004), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=512064 (last visited
Apr. 2, 2005).
179. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 547 (1982).
180. Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (1864).
181. See Reed Ueda, Immigration and Group Relations, in BEYOND THE COLOR LINE,
supra note 110, at 37, 37.
182. See BELL, supra note 116, at 58-59.
183. FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 293.
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Dutch American community.'84 Many consider assimilation be-
nign, especially as compared to oppression of the minority. Many
African Americans, however, want to preserve their culture
rather than be engulfed by the white majority. 185
For decades a primary goal of the civil rights movement was
racial integration. As de jure segregation ended, though, many
blacks shunned integration except in government and the work-
place; they accepted or preferred separate residential and social
communities. No doubt, this attitude stemmed in part from the
persistent indifference or hostility of whites to integration. The
arrival of any substantial number of blacks in a neighborhood or
public school routinely precipitated "white flight."8 6
Separation is now common not only in neighborhoods, schools,
and churches but even in universities. Many have dormitories
and academic and extracurricular programs dedicated primarily
to blacks."8 7 This separation finds theoretical justification in mul-
ticulturalism's insistence on a strong group identity."8 8 Separation
also appeals to some black politicians and academics (called "race
men""8 9) whose positions depend on continuing racial tension.
Separation entrenches racial tension. As noted earlier, trust
and cooperation are easier between people who know each other
and consider themselves similar; 9 ° racial separation makes trust
and cooperation harder. Separation does economic harm to mi-
norities. Many black neighborhoods are distant from most jobs,
especially better paying jobs.'9 ' High unemployment, broken
families, low commitment to education, and rampant drug abuse
184. See Reed Ueda, Immigration and Group Relations, in BEYOND THE COLOR LINE,
supra note 110, at 39.
185. See generally Philomena Essed & David Theo Goldberg, Cloning Cultures: The So-
cial Injustices of Sameness, 25 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 1066 (2002).
186. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 515 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(accepting the term "white flight" to describe the migration of whites from mixed race ar-
eas to the suburbs).
187. See Afshar-Mohajer & Sung, supra note 146, at 5-23 (documenting racial separa-
tion in campus programs and facilities).
188. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
189. See HAZEL V. CARBY, RACE MEN 4 (1998).
190. See supra notes 29-31, 45 and accompanying text.
191. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 42 (1987); see also Andrew Hacker, Saved?, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Aug. 14, 2003, at 22, 24 (stating that there are "several reasons" for the racial gap
in academic performance but that "at the center is the racial isolation" of African Ameri-
cans).
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and crime in these communities leave young people few good role
models. It is hard for them to learn the keys to economic success
since they have little contact with the business and professional
worlds and major nonprofit organizations. Higher education helps
blacks who pursue it to overcome these obstacles, but the racial
separation common on American campuses now reduces that
benefit.
Most whites dislike separationism and favor assimilation for
blacks and other minorities, even though whites created segrega-
tion and still often reinforce it. Although African Americans have
a right to resist assimilation, American principles guarantee a
right to pursue happiness, not to economic equality.1 92 It is ac-
cepted that individual economic success is tied to adoption of
middle class norms. 193 Economic success of a group also requires
that it follow these norms.' 94 Many whites will not be troubled by
economic inequality between the races if many blacks reject these
norms and embrace an ethic that hinders economic progress.
We do not need comprehensive agreement on cultural assimila-
tion or on all other goals, however; indeed, it is common for par-
ties who lack trust to begin with limited cooperation.19' Blacks
and whites can agree on many steps even if they disagree on oth-
ers. Further, attitudes are not uniform among either blacks or
whites; opinions diverge widely in each group. Since it is reason-
able for any group to resist the imposition of another culture, it
must be stressed that there is nothing inherently "white" about
these values. Though once identified with Protestantism, 196 they
were never embraced by all American Protestants, and Francis
Fukuyama says that they "later became deracinated from those
ethnoreligious roots and became a broadly accessible identity for
all America." '97
192. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
193. See Daniel Markovits, How Much Redistribution Should There Be?, 112 YALE L.J.
2291, 2295-97 (2003) (referring to consensus among philosophers that equality should cor-
rect for luck but not for morally responsible choices).
194. Multiculturalism, including black separatism, "represent[s] a mode of identity con-
trary to those classic ideas of the individual that we associate with bourgeois political
forms and that were indeed essential to that mode of social organization." SELIGMAN, su-
pra note 31, at 155.
195. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
196. See supra text accompanying note 183.
197. FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 270.
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The only error in this statement is that, while these values did
abet the "rise of the United States as a dominant global economic
power,"198 they are not uniquely American. They are what Max
Weber called the Protestant Ethic, to which he credited the eco-
nomic rise of northwestern Europe.'99 This ethic, however, is also
not inherently Protestant or European. The economic ascent of
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore is at-
tributed to similar values, which are said to stem from the in-
digenous culture. 20 0 These are simply values that promote success
in a capitalist democracy. Urging people to adopt these values
does not imply that they were previously doing anything wrong.
For individuals, groups, and entire nations, external conditions
beyond their control often preclude prosperity. Only when these
conditions are removed do values determine economic success.2"1
V. BUILDING INTERRACIAL TRUST AND EMPATHY
Despite many difficulties, there are some sources of interracial
trust and empathy in America today, and the literature on trust
and altruism suggests techniques to build on them.
A. Existing Sources of Trust and Empathy
Race relations in America are not unrelievedly bleak. There
has been progress, albeit slow and uneven.2 °2 Many Americans
feel trust and empathy for and behave altruistically toward other
races in general or at least to personal acquaintances of a differ-
ent race or to institutions that promote interracial empathy.
Trust can take root and grow when two sides share basic norms.
Despite the important differences already mentioned, "there are
many more beliefs, dreams, and views that whites and nonwhites
198. Id.
199. See generally MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM
(Talcott Parson trans. 1930).
200. See FLrKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 182-83. Japanese Buddhism promoted an ethic
"comparable to early Puritanism" in the West. Furthermore, it is still "critical to the suc-
cess of Japanese export industries." Id. "All East Asian cultures share a similar work
ethic." Id. at 343.
201. See infra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
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of all colors share than those that divide them."2"3 On many is-
sues-such as school prayer, school vouchers, abortion, and con-
cern about crime, violence, and drugs-African Americans are
more conservative than whites.24
Religion influences behavior as well as attitudes: "Religion, in-
dependent of social class, reduces deviance."2°5 African Americans
have deep religious beliefs, primarily Christian.2 6 White Ameri-
cans, too, are highly religious (at least compared to other Western
peoples), as are Hispanics, who are now America's largest ethnic
minority.20 7 Judeo-Christian values are deeply ingrained in West-
ern culture, especially in America. These values were openly
avowed by the Founders. The Declaration of Independence pro-
claims that all people "are created equal" and "endowed by their
Creator with certain inalienable Rights," including "Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness."2 8 Even Americans who reject Jew-
ish and Christian religions accept these values. Thus, religion can
be a powerful adhesive.
The religious commitment shared by black and white Ameri-
cans is the source of much of the good in our race relations. The
abolitionists appealed not to secular beliefs but to Christianity as
they persuaded western nations (including, eventually America)
that slavery, though common across the globe throughout history,
was immoral. 0 9 Martin Luther King, Jr. and the civil rights
203. ETZIONI, supra note 80, at 7.
204. Black Magic, ECONOMIST, July 15, 2000, at 29, 30; see also Ralph R. Reiland,
Crime and Race, 45 FREEMAN 5f6, 517 (1995) (stating that blacks are conservative on
crime issues); John M. McWhorter, Why Blacks Should Give Bush a Chance, CITY J.,
Spring 2001, at 28 (stating that blacks favor school prayer); Juan Williams, Bush
Shouldn't Write Off the Black Vote, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2004, at A21 (noting that many
blacks support school vouchers).
205. John J. DiIulio Jr., Supporting Black Churches, in BEYOND THE COLOR LINE, su-
pra note 110, at 156. "Among the most important [African-American institutions] histori-
cally have been various black churches and religious groups, which have provided an im-
portant counterweight to the atomizing forces to which the community was subject."
FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 303.
206. See, e.g., The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, Religion and Politics: Conten-
tion and Consensus, at http://pewforum.org/publications/surveys/religion-politics.pdf (last
visited Apr. 2, 2005).
207. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
208. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see RICHARD VETTERLI &
GARY BRYNER, IN SEARCH OF THE REPUBLIC: PUBLIC VIRTUE AND THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 4, 47 (1987) (describing the Founders' belief in religion as a source of public
virtue).
209. See RODNEY STARK, FOR THE GLORY OF GOD: How MONOTHEISM LED TO
REFORMATIONS, SCIENCE, WITCH-HUNTS, AND THE END OF SLAVERY 338-59 (2003).
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movement preached Judeo-Christian ideals to convince America
that Jim Crow segregation was a sin.21° These ideals also hold
that it is not enough to grant others legal freedom. God com-
mands us to "give to the poor."211 Not surprisingly, then, religious
Americans are more inclined to undertake charitable activity.212
The duty of brotherhood extends beyond our relatives, tribes,
countrymen, or our ethnic or racial group. It is universal, embrac-
ing even members of rival tribes, like the injured Levite who the
Good Samaritan rescued.213 As St. Paul said, in Christianity
"[t]here is neither Jew nor Greek," all mankind is one.214 We are
commanded to forgive, to "[1]ove your enemies, [and] do good to
them which hate you."215 In racial conflict, where normal human
tendencies are to be aggressive, uncooperative, and stingy-
attitudes that breed fear and hostility--Judeo-Christian princi-
ples can promote trust and altruism. Not all nominal Jews or
Christians work to overcome racial injustice. Religious beliefs
vary, and although Judeo-Christian ideals spearheaded abolition
and the civil rights movement, their opponents also appealed to
religion and still do.
The appeal to religion does not mean that atheists should be
excluded from racial dialogue or that religion should be estab-
lished by government. Most nonreligious Americans accept norms
like liberty and equality that stem from the Judeo-Christian tra-
dition. Government grants to religiously-affiliated institutions
make sense when they are the best candidates to implement so-
cial programs, but this does not establish religion. Interracial dia-
logue need not even refer to religion; if trust is strong, shared
values become axiomatic. Judeo-Christian ideals do not delineate
a specific, comprehensive social program, so theological allies can
disagree on policies. Still, shared faith gives black and white
Americans both motive and means to cooperate.216
210. See David A.J. Richards, Ethical Religion and the Struggle for Human Rights: The
Case of Martin Luther King, Jr., 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2105, 2151 (2004) (stating that Dr.
King "drew upon something that American whites and blacks deeply shared: constitution-
alism and a religion that was broadly Judaeo-Christian").
211. Matthew 19:21.
212. See Dilulio, supra note 205, at 155.
213. Luke 10:30-37.
214. Galatians 3:28.
215. Luke 6:27.
216. See WARREN, supra note 132, at 27 (describing success of local interracial coali-
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Differences of opinion between black and white Americans of-
ten stem more from disparities in socio-economic factors like in-
come, education, and occupation than from race per se.21 7 Trust
can develop between subgroups,218 including members of different
races who are similar with respect to these social factors and,
therefore, likely to have similar values. There are two caveats,
however: first, there are areas of disagreement, including some of
the most sensitive issues in race relations;219 second, shared val-
ues are not the same thing as shared opinions.
[Niumerous surveys indicate that poor Americans on welfare have
similar attitudes toward work, thrift, and dependence that middle-
class people do. But having the opinion that it is important to work
hard is different from having a work ethic, that is, being habituated
to getting up early in the morning to go to a dull or unpleasant job
and deferring consumption for the sake of long-term well-being.
220
Thus, people who profess similar values may react differently to
initiatives and incentives.
On the other hand, people can agree on a policy even if they
disagree on the reasons for the policy. "[WIhile various groups in
a society may hold to different ultimate values, they may be able
to agree to support the same public policies, albeit on different
grounds."221 Such agreement is common in pluralistic democra-
cies.
B. Increasing Interracial Trust and Empathy
How can the techniques for building trust and empathy be used
to improve race relations in America? An initial step is to get the
two sides better acquainted in settings that highlight their mu-
tual goodwill, common values, and interests and discourage dis-
tions despite significant sectarian theological differences).
217. See id. at 25-26.
218. See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
219. See WARREN, supra note 132, at 15.
220. FUKUYAMA, supra note 4, at 38 (footnotes omitted); see also Lawrence M. Mead, A
Biblical Response to Poverty, in LIFTING UP THE POOR: A DIALOGUE ON RELIGION, POVERTY
& WELFARE REFORM 53, 66-67 (2003) (stating that the poor express the same attitudes
about work as the better-off, "[blut for obscure reasons, the poor often fail" to work, to edu-
cate themselves and support their families).
221. ETZIONI, supra note 80, at 245. In such cases, however, consensus is more fragile
than it is when both groups share the same values.
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putes. Cultural differences can be explored respectfully. Each side
must take care not to imply its own superiority or to deprecate
the other side. Multiculturalism and activities exhibiting cultural
diversity can serve these purposes and so combat the deprecation
of African and African-American people and culture. Sometimes,
though, these efforts belabor supposed evils of Western civiliza-
tion.222 This should be avoided.
A policy against disputes may itself spark disagreement. Ag-
grieved people want their grievances to be addressed. If, for in-
stance, a marriage counselor advises a troubled couple not to dis-
cuss violence in their relationship because they disagree about it,
an abused spouse may justly feel that violence is the source of
their trouble and that the marriage cannot survive without dis-
cussing it. In race relations, a key issue is whether racial inequal-
ity stems from white racism or from insufficient effort by African
Americans. Although this is a fair question, the discussion often
collapses into a blame game of mutual recrimination that de-
stroys trust and respect and blocks agreement or cooperation.223
No answer to this question can please everyone, but a partial
answer may satisfy many. Part of the problem is conflicting con-
ceptions of "racism." Most whites relate it to current conduct. See-
ing how much racial discrimination and prejudice have declined,
they deny that racism is still common. Whites must acknowledge,
however, that the subordinate status of blacks stems not from
moral or intellectual inferiority, but from history. People of any
race who are denied education, skilled employment, and equal
protection of the law cannot thrive as do those who have enjoyed
these benefits.
This is true not only for groups within a society, but of entire
nations. Current economic disparities among European countries
show the irrelevance of race in this regard. Nations recently freed
from Soviet enslavement lag far behind nations long free.224 Un-
222. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
223. Thus Julian Bond, then chairman of the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People, decried the "'new racists,' [who] see continuing black-white dis-
parities as the consequence of 'family breakdown,' a 'lack of middle-class values,' a paucity
of 'education and skills,' and of the 'absence of role models.'" See BEYOND THE COLOR LINE,
supra note 110, at 6. "'[Tlhese are symptoms. Racism is the cause; its elimination is the
cure.'" Id.
224. See Unicef Warns of Poverty-Struck Kids in East Europe and Ex-USSR, ANSA
MEDIA SERVICE, Oct. 21, 2004.
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fortunately, people freed from oppression are often slow to em-
brace the individual habits that bring success in a free society
and the political programs of liberal, capitalist democracy.225 A
good example is eastern Germany, which still lags behind the
west despite national reunification. Eastern Germans lack the
work ethic, initiative, thrift, and solicitude for clients and cus-
tomers that western Germans have. 2 ' This is not surprising.
These traits do not come naturally to humans; they must be
learned, and not primarily in formal schooling, but in the family
and community as one grows up.
The economic success of some Asian nations is also instructive.
These nations were once poor by American standards because of
conditions beyond their control. When conditions changed, they
achieved economic growth (despite a dearth of natural resources)
by promoting education, industry, enterprise, thrift, and coopera-
tion.227
Once, it was not only pointless but dangerous for blacks to pur-
sue education or display enterprise. In the old South, it is said,
"'whites don't care how close Negroes get, just as long as they
don't get too big.' 22  Blacks who showed any ambition were
dressed down and humiliated and could be robbed, beaten, im-
prisoned, or slain.229 Some may consider these facts too well
known to merit repetition, but given the long history of racial
slander alleging the innate inferiority of blacks, it is important to
repeat this truth.
Even though current conditions stem from history, it does not
mean we have no control over the future. We have free will and
can make progress individually, in groups, and as a nation. After
World War II, many countries made remarkable economic gains.
Also, Victorian England achieved striking social progress, largely
225. See Bertrand Benoit & Hugh Williamson, The Border That Separated Two Coun-
tries Is Long Gone But Starkly Different Economic Performance and Political Affiliations
Show the Divisions Persist, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004, at 17.
226. See id.
227. See World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report tbl.1, at http://www.
weforum.org/pdf/GCR/Growth competitivenessIndex_2003_comparisons (last visited Apr.
2, 2005) [hereinafter Global Competitiveness Report].
228. See Gregory D. Stanford, Hypersegregation Label Still Applies to Area Suburbs,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 19, 2003, at 4J. Comedian Dick Gregory also retorted, "in
the North, whites don't care how big Negroes get, just as long as they don't get too close."
Id.
229. See id.
20051 1039
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
by private efforts.2 3' The civil rights movement succeeded in end-
ing de jure segregation and outlawing racial discrimination by
the government and, in many areas, by private parties." 1 It
proved the fatalists wrong: racial progress is possible in America.
Any reference by whites to values or behavior of African Ameri-
cans provokes objections that this lets whites off the hook for the
race problem they created. Many African Americans also call for
better values and behavior.2 32 These advocates are not, as some-
times charged, just a few unrepresentative black conservatives.
Many are liberals who certainly do not let whites off the hook.2 33
To reduce racial hypersensitivity on this issue it should be
stressed that people of all colors often must work hard to over-
come injuries (physical or otherwise) suffered through no fault of
their own.2 34 This is true of communities and nations devastated
by, perhaps, a hurricane or military invasion, as well as individu-
als. It should also be stressed that most disadvantaged Americans
are white235 and that they are exhorted to adopt the same atti-
tudes and conduct that is urged on African Americans.
The other side of the blame game is the charge that all whites
are morally responsible and legally liable for the plight of blacks.
This charge underlies the reparations movement, which demands
that white Americans pay for the injuries to blacks. The legal ba-
sis for the claim is flimsy. The closest precedent for reparations-
the payments by Germany and a few German companies to some
230. See generally GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, POVERTY AND COMPASSION: THE MORAL
IMAGINATION OF THE LATE VICTORIANS (1991).
231. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000).
232. Felicia R. Lee, Cosby Defends His Remarks About Poor Blacks' Values, N.Y.
TIMES, May 22, 2004, at B7.
233. See, e.g., Bob Herbert, Editorial, Civil Rights, The Sequel, N.Y. TIMES, July 7,
2003, at A13 ("My suggestion: Hammer home the need to stop the self-destruction that
continues to block the advancement of millions of black Americans.").
234. "You can blame a person for knocking you down but you can't blame that person if
you refuse to get back up .... However much slave history taught us about the injustice
and misery we as a people had suffered, it did not excuse us from assuming responsibility
for ourselves and each other by altering its course." BENJAMIN KARIM ET AL., REMEMBER-
ING MALCOLM 109 (1992) (quoting Malcolm X).
235. The average poverty rate from 2001 to 2003 was 10.2% for whites and 23.7% for
blacks. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2003, at 12 (2004), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p60-226.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2005). There were,
however, approximately twenty-three million poor whites and eight million poor blacks.
Id. See also Michelle Conlin & Aaron Bernstein, Working and Poor, BUS. WK., May 31,
2004, at 58, 61 (reporting that fifty-eight percent of working poor in United States are
white and fourteen percent are black).
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victims of the Holocaust and their children-is far different from
the claims of the reparations movement.236 In general, the idea of
racial guilt and group reparations are in bad odor; no reparations
have been paid by or even seriously demanded from the aggres-
sors of World War II or from Russia for the enslavement of east-
ern Europe after that war.
Although reparations are often posed as an alternative to calls
for self-help that let whites off the hook, many proposals for repa-
rations blur this distinction. Liability to a class is usually dis-
charged by payments to each of its members, but many calls for
reparations eschew this remedy in favor of funding better schools
for blacks.237 This is wise, but it points out the folly of using the
term "reparations." Calls for better schools acknowledge that the
problems of blacks stem, in part, from poor education. Education
requires not just good schools but effort by students and their
families. Providing better education rather than cash, then, in ef-
fect requires reciprocal effort. Demands for reparations are also
coercive and thus reduce the altruism of donors.23 They are un-
wise because the cooperation of whites is essential.
Demands for reparations are also morally flawed. Most whites
are not personally guilty of racial wrongs or even the descendants
of people guilty of such wrongs. They reasonably deny liability,
especially since victims of racial discrimination are either dead or
have legal recourse against actual wrongdoers. Reparations are
demanded for all African Americans, but some are recent immi-
grants; they and their ancestors suffered no discrimination in
America.
Finally, the detriments suffered by blacks because of race are
not the only injuries suffered by Americans. The most important
determinant of the economic success of Americans is the quality
of the parenting they receive.239 People are also influenced by the
236. See generally Gabriel Schoenfeld, Holocaust Reparations-A Growing Scandal,
110 COMMENTARY 25 (2000).
237. See Carlos Sadovi, Reparations for Descendants of Slaves: Do Companies Owe a
Debt?, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Jan. 11, 2004, at 1E (stating that plaintiffs in lawsuit seek-
ing reparations want recovery to be used to fund social programs); Tara Young, Professor:
Slave Reparations Go Beyond Money; Movement Is About Recognition, He Says, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Apr. 16, 2004, at Metrol (quoting reparations movement leader
Charles Ogletree, Jr. as saying that reparations should be used to fund programs, not just
be given to people in cash).
238. See supra notes 71, 78 and accompanying text.
239. Not only are children unable to choose their parents, but the parents also lack
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neighborhood in which they grow up and the schools to which
they are sent, matters over which they have no control. Although
on average blacks trail whites economically,24 ° many blacks have
achieved economic success, and most poor Americans are not
black.241 Disadvantaged whites may reasonably ask why they
should not only be denied benefits demanded for blacks who are
better off than themselves but should also be expected to pay part
of those benefits.
Similar objections apply to the programs of racial preferences
that are now widespread. These programs produce paltry benefits
for a handful of the least needy blacks.242 In college admissions
they affect only a few elite schools.243 Most beneficiaries are capa-
ble people who would have done quite well anyway; preferences
merely bump them up a notch or two.
Lowering standards for blacks may sap their will to do their
best.244 Black students admitted to schools for which they are not
complete control over the quality of parenting they give. Parents who are poor or disabled
are less able to give their children good care. SUSAN E. MAYER & LEONARD M. LOPOO, HAS
THE INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF ECONOMIC STATUS CHANGED? (Joint Center
for Poverty Research, Working Paper No. 227, 2001) available at http://www.jcpr.org/
wpfiles/mayer lopoo.PDF?CFID=4460116&CFTOKEN=65444000 (last visited Apr. 2,
2005).
240. "In 1995, the median income for black families was $25,970, while the figure for
whites was $42,646." JOHN H. MCWHORTER, LOSING THE RACE: SELF-SABOTAGE IN BLACK
AMERICA 9 (2000).
241. See supra note 235.
242. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 354 n.3 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("[T]he Law School's racial discrimination does nothing for those too poor or uneducated to
participate in elite higher education and therefore presents only an illusory solution to the
challenges facing our Nation."); Martin Trow, Preferential Admissions in Higher Educa-
tion, in BEYOND THE COLOR LINE, supra note 110, at 295 (noting that "in 1995, 30 percent
of black undergraduates [at the University of California at Berkeley] came from families
earning over $70,000"). Further, at some campuses as many as two-thirds of black stu-
dents are not descendants of American slaves but West Indian and African immigrants or
their children or children of biracial couples. Sara Rimer & Karen W. Arenson, Top Col-
leges Take More Blacks, But Which Ones?, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2004, at Al.
243. See Trow, supra note 242, at 294 (stating that 'no more than a hundred or so out
of the 3,700 colleges and universities in the United States" "have more applicants than
they can admit").
244. Out of deference, elite universities have offered the license not to compete to
the most privileged segment of black youth, precisely the segment that has no
excuse for not competing .... [Wihites and especially Asians have had to com-
pete all the harder for their spots. So we end up with the effect we always get
with deferential reforms: an incentive to black weakness relative to others.
SHELBY STEELE, A DREAM DEFERRED: THE SECOND BETRAYAL OF BLACK FREEDOM IN
AMERICA 127 (1998); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 377 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating
that the racial preferences system reduces incentive for black applicants to improve their
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academically qualified tend not to perform well.245 They suffer a
stigma because everyone knows just by looking at them that they
are less qualified than their classmates. Simultaneously, the be-
lief that any shortcoming of blacks stems from white racism gives
black students an easy alibi for poor performance.246 When they
take the next step (such as graduates seeking jobs), they suffer
because others (like prospective employers) know that they were
admitted with lesser credentials. Further, racial preferences do
nothing for the vast majority of blacks who are not candidates for
the few positions allotted by racial preferences. Not surprisingly,
many blacks oppose preferences.247
Although the benefits of racial preferences are minuscule and
ill-targeted, they provoke terrible resentment among whites. This
resentment may be unwarranted, but it is not surprising. If a
prestigious school gives fifty seats to minorities through race pref-
erences, fifty other applicants who would otherwise have been
admitted are rejected, but these fifty are not identified. Hundreds
of applicants may believe they were rejected because of race pref-
erences. Hundreds more suspect they would not have been admit-
ted even without racial preferences, but still resent the admission
of minorities with weaker academic credentials than their own.24
Further stoking resentment is the realization that many benefici-
aries of racial preferences are wealthier than applicants who were
rejected.249 Some whites also object that, if a debt is owed to Afri-
can Americans, it should not be foisted arbitrarily on a few ran-
dom individuals by discriminating against them in employment
LSAT scores); PAUL A. ZOCH, DOOMED TO FAIL: THE BUILT-IN DEFECTS OF AMERICAN
EDUCATION 198 (2004) (arguing that American schools need to demand more of students of
all colors).
245. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 372 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("These overmatched stu-
dents take the bait, only to find that they cannot succeed in the cauldron of competition.");
Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Thernstrom, Reflections on The Shape of the River, 46
UCLA L. REV. 1583, 1605-08 (1999).
246. See STEELE, supra note 244, at 125 (stating that this attitude "never requires that
[African Americans] actually develop as Americans, and absolutely never blames blacks
when they don't develop").
247. See PAUL M. SNIDERMAN & THOMAS PIAZZA, BLACK PRIDE AND BLACK PREJUDICE
149-50 (2002) (reporting that eighty percent of blacks oppose admitting less qualified
black students over more qualified white students even if the disparity is slight); see also
McWhorter, supra note 152, at 41 (citing a poll showing that eighty-six percent of black
voters opposed racial preferences).
248. See Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: Bakke and the Basic Arithmetic of Selec-
tive Admissions, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1046-48 (2002).
249. See generally id.
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or school admissions; rather, the burden should be borne by all
whites, preferably in proportion to their ability to pay.
Whatever the moral merits of racial preferences, resentment is
a political problem for blacks. Because of both their own votes
and the desire of many whites for greater racial equality, blacks
have substantial political clout-substantial, but not limitless.
Resources squandered on racial preferences cannot be devoted to
other goals. Many whites believe that the current racial prefer-
ences exhaust the political capital of blacks. Thus, the opportu-
nity costs of racial preferences are high.
Racial preferences are touted-and were upheld by the Su-
preme Court of the United States-as a means of achieving vital
diversity.25° This claim is widely considered weak or a mere sub-
terfuge.251 Efforts to document the educational benefits of racial
diversity have been embarrassing failures.252 This is not surpris-
ing; ethnic homogeneity (in colleges and elsewhere) does not pre-
250. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (holding that a public law school "has a compelling inter-
est in attaining a diverse student body").
251. See id. at 383 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (calling the university's claim to be
seeking a critical mass of minorities for purposes of educational diversity "simply a
sham"); Alan M. Dershowitz & Laura Hanft, Affirmative Action and the Harvard College
Diversity-Discretion Model: Paradigm or Pretext?, 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 379, 407 (1979)
("[T]he checkered history of 'diversity' demonstrates that it was designed largely as a cover
to achieve other legally, morally, and politically controversial goals."); R. Kent
Greenawalt, The Unresolved Problems of Reverse Discrimination, 67 CAL. L. REV. 87, 122
(1979) ("I have yet to find a professional academic who believes the primary motivation for
preferential admissions has been to promote diversity in the student body for the better
education of all the students."); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 471
(1997) ("Everyone knows that in most cases a true diversity of perspectives and back-
grounds is not really being pursued."); Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present,
and Future, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 34 (2002) ("[M]any of affirmative action's more
forthright defenders readily concede that diversity is merely the current rationale of con-
venience for a policy that they prefer to justify on other grounds."); Randall Kennedy, Af-
firmative Reaction: The Courts, the Right and the Race Question, AMERICAN PROSPECT
ONLINE, Mar. 1, 2003 (stating that "[m]any who defend affirmative action for the sake of
'diversity' are actually motivated by a concern that is considerably more compelling.., a
commitment to social justice"); Orlando Patterson, Affirmative Action: The Sequel, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 2003, at 11 (stating that no one really believes the diversity rationale for
racial preferences). The ruse is further indicated by the fact that supposed advocates of
diversity show no interest in intellectual diversity. "Selective schools ... have done little
to attract students who are politically conservative or devoutly religious.... How many
have enough undergraduates to form a 'right to life' chapter, for example?" Hacker, supra
note 191, at 22.
252. Both the methodology and the conclusions of these studies have been refuted. See,
e.g., Stanley Rothman et al., Racial Diversity Reconsidered, 151 PUB. INT. 25, 29-38 (2003)
(discussing the empirical flaws of these studies and the results obtained with improved
methods).
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vent nations like Japan and the Scandinavian countries from
competing successfully in the global economy."' The diversity ra-
tionale also treats preferences for blacks as a benefit primarily to
whites even though they are promoted largely by blacks.
Whites are unlikely to warm to race preferences. Many feel
that the racial discrimination cited to justify preferences has al-
ready dwindled so that preferences should now end. Some states
now outlaw preferences in school admissions; 54 others may follow
suit.255 Although the Supreme Court upheld racial preferences,256
its demand that applicants be weighed individually and that race
not be a dominant factor in admissions will be hard for some
schools to meet.257 They can admit a "critical mass" of blacks (al-
ways five to ten percent of each class) only by using academic
standards so much lower as to flunk the requirement that race be
just one of many plus factors.2s8
Indeed, the Court upheld a law school's racial preferences only
by accepting some factual claims derided as "simply a sham" by
253. See Global Competitiveness Report, supra note 227, tbl.1.
254. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31.
255. Karen W. Arenson, Ballot Measure Seen in Wake of Court Ruling, N.Y. TIMES,
July 10, 2003, at A17 (reporting that African-American businessman Ward Connerly, who
led the successful effort to pass California's Proposition 209, plans to put a similar meas-
ure before Michigan voters); Hacker, supra note 191, at 22 (stating that after decisions in
Gratz and Grutter "it seems likely that at least a few other [states] will now be inclined to"
adopt laws forbidding racial preferences).
256. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
257. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 348-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (listing several possible is-
sues for future litigation); Carl Cohen, Winks, Nods, Disguises--and Racial Preference, 116
COMMENTARY 34, 37 (2003) (noting the sheer magnitude of the task of individualizing ad-
missions reviews at University of Michigan, which has 25,000 undergraduate applicants
annually); Mike France & William C. Symonds, Diversity Is about to Get More Elusive, Not
Less, Bus. WK., July 7, 2003, at 31 (stating that the Court's ruling will force schools to en-
gage in a "laborious" analysis requiring employment of more admissions officers); Hacker,
supra note 191, at 22 (concluding that the University of Michigan "may have a hard time"
satisfying Grutter).
258. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 796-97 (6th Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissent-
ing) (finding that the University of Michigan Law School gave "very substantial additional
weight" to minority applicants for admission), affd, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Trow, supra note
242, at 298-301 (describing the lengths to which the University of California at Berkeley's
Law School, Boalt Hall, had to go to meet its goals for enrolling African-American stu-
dents); Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical
Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission
Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 14-18 (1997) (showing that most black law students would
not have been admitted if admissions were based solely on undergraduate grades and
LSAT scores); Lino A. Graglia, Winks, Nods-and Preferences, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2003,
at A12 (noting that almost no African Americans meet the median GPA and LSAT scores
of white students at the half-dozen top law schools).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist.25 9 Rejection of the college's somewhat
different program led Justice Ginsburg to predict that schools
may "resort to camouflage" and "winks, nods, and disguises."26 °
Soon the Court will face new cases in which lower courts reject
such claims. 261 Then the Court, hoist by its own petard, must
strike down most racial preferences or change its standard. The
Court also expressed doubt that preferences will be needed for
more than twenty-five years.262 This declaration will fuel de-
mands to begin phasing out preferences, thereby lowering their
benefits and raising their political cost to blacks.
Despite the gross flaws in racial preferences as a solution to
America's racial problem, it is understandable that blacks cling to
them. A person may agree that her house or car is not ideal for
her needs, but she will not accept its simply being taken away
from her. The obvious solution is to trade in the unsuitable item
for one more appropriate. A trade-in makes sense for racial pref-
erences. In economic terms, they are not Pareto Optimal.263 Al-
though there will be no consensus on a substitute, both sides can
easily identify measures more beneficial to blacks and less objec-
tionable to whites. Some of these are discussed below.264
How can a trade-in be negotiated? Racial preferences are
granted by many businesses, government agencies, schools, and
nonprofit organizations. 265 Negotiations with each would be im-
practical. Many of these institutions also lack resources that can
be substituted in exchange. Indeed, many institutions seem to
have adopted racial preferences out of a feeling that they should
do something about racial inequality and could not think of any-
thing else to do. In other words, preferences are a gesture by
259. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 383 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
260. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 304-05 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
261. See Cohen, supra note 257, at 38 ("[Ilt will be very hard [for universities] to hide
the reality of their practices, and these will be subjected to continuing adverse scrutiny.").
This prediction has already been vindicated. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Order
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 294 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2004) (striking down racial preferences in
public school assignments in Seattle).
262. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
263. An economic situation is Pareto Optimal "when an individual cannot move into a
better position without putting someone else into a worse position." DICTIONARY OF
FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 405 (John Downes & Jordan Elliot Goodman eds., 4th
ed. 1995).
264. See infra Part VI.
265. See PETER H. SCH-UCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE
DISTANCE 140-43 (2003).
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whites primarily to assuage their guilt.266 Accordingly, arranging
a trade-in will require national leadership that includes, but is
not limited to, the federal government.
One obstacle to a trade-in is that preferences have spawned an
industry employing many blacks.267 These programs need admin-
istrators. Also, since many blacks admitted or hired under prefer-
ences are less qualified than their white colleagues,26 they need
special assistance, like remedial courses and retention programs.
The desire of some blacks for separation from whites, intensified
by the stigma of preferences, leads to the creation of separate fa-
cilities, activities, and academic programs for blacks. All these
initiatives have to be staffed. Those employed in this industry
would be threatened by the end of preferences.269
Although the economics of a trade-in are easy, the politics are
hard. In a pluralist democracy, a small group that profits from a
program that disserves society as a whole often prevails if the
program's costs to the majority are so diffused that few are moti-
vated to oppose it. Accordingly, the terms of a trade-in should be
as explicit as possible so that its potential beneficiaries, especially
among blacks, will be motivated to support the trade-in.
C. Limiting the Group of Discussants and the Scope of Discussion
The current animosity in race relations makes it desirable to
limit the participants in racial dialogue. In group relations, levels
of trust typically vary among the members of each group and
from one locale to another.27 ° It makes sense for each side to
choose members with higher levels of trust to negotiate and exe-
266. See id. at 151 ("Affirmative action is often justified as a means of compensating
groups that have been victimized in the past by persecution and discrimination inflicted
by the dominant majority.").
267. See OFFICE OF RESEARCH, INFORMATION & PLANNING, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYMENT 2 (2003) (not-
ing that blacks are the minority with the highest percentage of private sector employ-
ment).
268. See Thernstrom & Thernstrom, supra note 245, at 1610-11.
269. However, most of these people are skilled professionals who can find jobs else-
where; indeed, some would certainly wind up producing something of use to society, which
they are not doing now.
270. See Michael W. Macy & John Skvoretz, The Evolution of Trust and Cooperation
Between Strangers: A Computational Model, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 638, 651 (1998).
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cute joint projects.271 Since familiarity often breeds trust, coopera-
tion may work best at the local level, where people know each
other better.272
An agent who impedes a mutually desirable bargain should be
fired.273 It is especially imperative to exclude obstructionists in
emotional areas like race relations. Since interracial cooperation
is needed, it is not enough for the two sides to bargain aggres-
sively; discussions should enhance trust so as to promote continu-
ing cooperation. Discourtesy to the other side, displays of suspi-
cion, and aggressive negotiating erode trust. 4 Since some
African-American leaders (at least in Congress) mistrust whites
and support policies offensive to whites,275 it would be wise to
seek a "coalition of the willing." This already happens to some ex-
tent at the local level,276 and opportunities for cooperation may be
growing, since minority leaders are becoming more moderate. 7
The issues for discussion should also be restricted. Where trust is
low, parties should put aside grudges and seek common ground,
"contemplating visions about what the future could bring if only
the dispute that confronts them can be surmounted."278 Coopera-
tion can expand as commitments are fulfilled and trust grows.279
Putting the two limitations together, some groups will be able
to reach agreement on certain issues, other groups on other is-
sues. Of course, this already happens; various groups of black and
271. See JOSEPH L. BADARACCO, JR., THE KNOWLEDGE LINK: How FIRMS COMPETE
THROUGH STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 141 (1991) (stating that a successful alliance needs
"champions'... on both sides-that is, managers with appropriate skills who are person-
ally committed to making the venture work"); LEWIS, supra note 11, at 29 (stating that
negotiating is so important that some firms "'select people with less than perfect intellects
but with excellent interpersonal skills'").
272. See WARREN, supra note 132, at 27 (describing success of many local interracial
coalitions); Macy & Skvoretz, supra note 270, at 653-58.
273. See KOROBKIN & ZASLOFF, supra note 178, at 33.
274. See supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.
275. See Tamar Jacoby, From Protest to Politics: Still an Issue for Black Leadership, in
BEYOND THE COLOR LINE, supra note 110, at 369, 371-73 (documenting a gap in attitudes
about race between black leaders and black public); see also supra note 112; infra text ac-
companying notes 333-34.
276. See Black Magic, ECONOMIST, July 15, 2000, at 29, 30 (reporting that some local
Republican officials have developed trust and cooperation with African Americans).
277. See ETZIONI, supra note 80, at 30-32.
278. Howard Raiffa, Analytical Barriers, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 132,
140 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995). See also CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE
MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING CONFLICT 177-81 (1986).
279. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
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280
white Americans cooperate on issues on which they agree.
These efforts need to be expanded. To some extent, this can be
done by private initiative, but the potential for private efforts
alone is limited. To maximize progress, government involvement
is needed.
D. Legal Liability vs. Moral Duty
Although the legal basis for reparations is weak, Judaism and
Christianity instruct those who are able to aid all who need
help.28' Arguing moral duty rather than legal liability has several
advantages apart from avoiding the jurisprudential flaws of the
latter. Psychologically, it is easier to accept a moral duty to help
the needy than to admit legal liability, which implies an admis-
sion of personal fault. Coercion provokes resistance,2 82 but volun-
tary donations make donors feel virtuous. It is also more appeal-
ing morally to aid the needy than it is to pay a legal debt to each
member of some group regardless of the individual recipient's
need.
The civil rights movement succeeded largely by squeezing the
conscience of whites.283 Most abolitionists were whites appealing
to the Christian beliefs of fellow whites.284 By contrast, the urban
riots of the late 1960s precipitated a conservative tide in politics
and accelerated white flight from cities.2 85 The push for racial
preferences and reparations have frittered away much political
280. See WARREN, supra note 132, at 247 (noting the collaboration of black and white
Americans around a common policy agenda).
281. See Melanie D. Acevedo, Note, Client Choices, Community Values: Why Faith-
Based Legal Services Providers Are Good for Poverty Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1491,
1523-24 (2002).
282. See supra notes 71, 78, 94-95 and accompanying text.
283. The exposure to the world of segregation and discrimination by the civil rights
movement also damaged the United States in the Cold War struggle with Communism.
Desire to end this negative publicity abetted the agreement of whites to end this mis-
treatment. See MARY DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 107-13 (2000); Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice:
The Warren Court and the Conservative "Backlash," 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1546-47
(2003).
284. See Stephen L. Carter, Reflections on the Separation of Church and State, 44 ARIZ.
L. REV. 293, 305 (2002).
285. See Feld, supra note 283, at 1546-47 (describing conservative impact of urban ri-
ots on criminal law policies); Clarence Page, What Brown Did Not Bring to Education,
CHI. TRIB., Mar. 17, 2004, at E29 (stating that urban riots helped cause white flight).
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capital while yielding little benefit.1 6 Stern reminders of Judeo-
Christian moral duties and the notion that whites themselves
would profit from the economic progress of African Americans,
coupled with offers of cooperation, can be effective, but militance
will fail.
Programs based on moral duty are also likely to be better for
the needy. Legal debts must be paid unconditionally, but chari-
ties can impose duties on recipients. These conditions can be but-
tressed by moral suasion as well as legal sanctions. Thus commu-
nity leaders can exhort recipients of aid to keep their side of the
bargain; reparations carry no such moral duty. Further, perform-
ance standards can be imposed on aid programs. Effective pro-
grams can be given increased funding while failed programs can
be terminated. Reparations cannot be so treated.
Aid to the needy, both individuals and nations, is more effective
when performance standards are imposed on recipients and com-
pliance is monitored. Even most liberals now admit that the rapid
expansion in the 1960s and 1970s of social welfare programs,
with few conditions on recipients, did not work well.28 7 Many be-
came dependent on welfare and lost the chance to climb the em-
ployment ladder and become good role models for their own chil-
dren and their neighbors.288 In the 1990s, welfare restrictions and
renewed emphasis on work helped many make economic progress
while producing little of the indigence and other horrors that
some had predicted.2 9 This approach worked in part because re-
cipients themselves approved it.2 90 The reforms of the 1990s were
far from perfect, though. Many who left welfare for work remain
286. See supra notes 238, 248 and accompanying text.
287. See June E. O'Neill & M. Anne Hill, Gaining Ground? Measuring the Impact of
Welfare Reform on Welfare and Work, Manhattan Institute Civic Report No. 17, at 2 (July
2001).
288. See Margo D. Butts, Urban Welfare Reform: A Community-Based Perspective, 22
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 897, 898-99 (1995).
289. See Rebecca M. Blank & Robert F. Schoeni, Changes in the Distribution of Chil-
dren's Family Income over the 1990s, 5 (Jan. 2003), available at http://www-per
sonal.umich.edu/-bschoeni/blankschoeni%20pp.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2005); O'Neill &
Hill, supra note 287, at 4.
290. "[M]any welfare recipients themselves [said] that they needed the push of a work
requirement to overcome their own lack of initiative in finding jobs or training experiences
that later turned out to be valuable to them." Mary Jo Bane, A Catholic Policy Analyst
Looks at Poverty, in LIFTING UP THE POOR: A DIALOGUE ON RELIGION, POVERTY &
WELFARE REFORM 12, 47 (2003); see also Mead, supra note 220, at 94 ("All told, reciprocity
emerges as clearly the best approach to aiding the poor through government....").
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in or near poverty. 291 Americans should be much more generous to
these people. Demanding reciprocity and effective programs abets
generosity.292 Most Americans prefer assistance that requires re-
ciprocal effort from recipients and helps them become independ-
ent.29 3
Government can learn from private charities that appeal to do-
nors by publicizing their accomplishments. Governments can set
performance targets for their programs. Setting targets is par-
ticularly effective when the money goes to private organizations.
Government bureaucrats cannot be fired for failing to meet goals,
but grants to private groups can be ended. Organizations seeking
government money can be required to state their targets. To ob-
tain grants, they have an incentive to set their goals high. To
keep the money flowing, they then have an incentive to meet
their own stated goals.
E. Racialized vs. Universal Programs
People tend to trust and cooperate with those they consider like
themselves and to distrust those they consider different.294 How-
ever, notions of who is like us and who is different often are not
deeply rooted but mutable and manipulable.295 The very act of
designating subgroups strengthens trust and cooperation within
each subgroup but weakens trust and cooperation between sub-
groups.296 Because of the complexity of and ambivalence about
race in America, the inclination of Americans to trust and cooper-
ate with people of another color is highly unstable and subject to
outside influence.
To enhance trust and cooperation between blacks and whites,
we should stress our commonalities (like Judeo-Christian ethics)
291. See Katherine Hunt Federle, Child Welfare and the Juvenile Court, 60 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1225, 1231-32 (1999).
292. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
293. See MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE
POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 58-59, 184-92 (1999).
294. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
296. See Macy & Skvoretz, supra note 270, at 648 (noting that neighbors tended to both
trust and cooperate with each other, while they did not cooperate with strangers in one
part of the experiment).
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and play down differences. Racial preferences and reparations di-
vide us by race and thus erode trust and cooperation.297 Some lo-
cal initiatives achieve cooperation by pursuing not "affirmative
action" but "affirmative opportunity." 29 Proposals that harp on
supposed behavioral shortcomings of poor blacks but not of poor
whites are also divisive. Although the poverty rate is higher
among blacks, there are more poor whites in America,299 so blacks
and whites can unite on an agenda to help the needy. The poor of
all races generally lack political clout; they need allies. When
people feel they need each other, they tend to eschew prejudice. °°
The problems of the poor will not be cured by neglect (benign or
otherwise). Even in the prosperous 1990s, the income gap be-
tween blacks and whites barely shrank, and the gap between rich
and poor actually grew within each race.0 1 Social mobility also
declined. That is, not only did the amount of poverty persist, but
the poor were largely the same people and not a randomly rotat-
ing group of people either temporarily down on their luck, or
young or newly arrived in America and destined to achieve pros-
perity quickly.0 2
Efforts (unlike racial preferences and reparations) not limited
to blacks may be derided as "color blind" and inadequate. Justice
Harry Blackmun claimed: "In order to get beyond racism, we
must first take account of race. There is no other way. And in or-
der to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differ-
ently."0 3 President Lyndon Johnson said: "You do not take a per-
son who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him,
bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say, 'you are
free to compete with all the others."'3 4
297. See SCHUCK, supra note 265, at 165, 199 (stating that racial preferences are "so-
cially inflammatory" and that race is "the worst imaginable category around which to or-
ganize group competition and social relations more generally"); see also supra note 248
and accompanying text (noting that racial preferences can cause white resentment toward
minorities).
298. See WARREN, supra note 132, at 252; see also id. at 247-48 (describing work of In-
dustrial Areas Foundation in many cities and other efforts in interracial cooperation).
299. See supra note 235.
300. See WARREN, supra note 132, at 27.
301. See ETZIONI, supra note 80, at 76-77, 148.
302. See Gene Koretz, Land of Less Opportunity, BUS. WK., June 30, 2003, at 28.
303. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing).
304. Lyndon B. Johnson, To Fulfill These Rights, Address at Howard University (June
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Many people are hobbled for many reasons, however, only some
of which relate to race. It is just to help all these people. "We
should help people who need help. There are, in fact, no races
that need help; only individuals, citizens."" 5 President Johnson's
metaphor has another implication: we can help those who have
been hobbled to join the race by giving them therapeutic counsel-
ing and equipment and economic support during therapy, but
they themselves must make a special effort for that therapy to
succeed. In a sense this is unjust because those who were not
hobbled need not exert that effort, but such injustice is a result of
past events that we cannot change.
It is misleading to call measures color blind just because they
omit explicit racial criteria. Again, while most poor Americans are
not black, they are disproportionately black, 0 6 so programs for
the poor disproportionately benefit blacks. For example, residents
of poor neighborhoods are often isolated from jobs.0 7 Efforts to
bring them to jobs and to bring jobs to them need not be race-
based; since the problem is particularly acute for blacks, even
color-blind programs to mitigate the problem would benefit them
disproportionately. More generally, we can examine the racial ef-
fects of all public policies and prefer those that promote racial
equality and harmony.
Justice Blackmun was wrong that "[there is no other way. "308
Millions of blacks, like other Americans beset by problems they
did not make, have achieved economic success without racial
preferences or reparations. Perhaps Justice Blackmun believed
that racial preferences would greatly advance racial equality.
That belief is now obviously wrong. An "other way" is not only
possible but necessary, because racially discriminatory measures
will not overcome inequality.
4, 1965), reprinted in THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY 126
(Lee Rainwater & William L. Yancey eds., 1967).
305. Steele, supra note 163, at 42.
306. The American Marketplace, Most Poor Are White: Although Blacks Are More
Likely to be Poor, Whites Account for the Majority of People Living in Poverty 161 (1999);
see also supra note 235.
307. See Maurice E.R. Munroe, Unamerican Tail: Of Segregation and Multicultural
Education, 64 ALB. L. REV. 241, 247-49 (2000); Michael H. Schill, Deconstructing the Inner
City Poor, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 795, 802 n.36 (1991).
308. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Eschewing racial discrimination does not preclude acknowl-
edgement of race. Since racial separation in housing and educa-
tion damages blacks, °9 both government and private groups may
fairly consider race by encouraging integration. Also, since atti-
tudes and behavior often vary by race, it makes sense to learn the
differences and to address problems in ways that take them into
account. Since many blacks suspect a conspiracy to infect them
with AIDS,31° for example, different approaches to AIDS educa-
tion may be warranted in predominantly black schools. Such ef-
forts do not discriminate because programs in mostly white
schools would be equally funded; they would simply use different
approaches.
College programs to recruit students are another area where
racial distinctions make sense. High school students' knowledge
about higher education varies by race even after correcting for
factors like family income and parents' education. Schools may
reasonably pursue black students in ways that take these differ-
ences into account. Outreach programs targeted to black students
do not violate the rights of any individual. This is important both
because the Constitution's guaranty of equal protection applies to
individuals, not racial groups,311 and because the protection of in-
dividuals embodied in this and other clauses of the Constitution
reflects the value afforded to individuals (as opposed to identity
groups) in western civilization and especially in America. Even if
group level discrimination is not illegal, it is divisive and should
be employed only when nondiscriminatory measures will not
work.
Although programs should not be racialized, it is helpful if they
are supported by black leaders. People more readily accept deci-
sions that they helped to make.312 Such acceptance is particularly
important when a project requires not just their acquiescence but
also their active support, as is the case with programs to improve
the education or employment of some group.
309. See Munroe, supra note 307, at 244-53.
310. See Darryl Fears, Study: Many Blacks Cite AIDS Conspiracy; Prevention Efforts
Hurt, Activists Say, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2005, at A2.
311. "[N]or shall any State... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
312. See Brockner & Siegel, supra note 58, at 391; Kahan, supra note 43, at 20 (stating
that negotiations with communities promote their acceptance of government actions).
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F. The Role of Government
Through the 1960s and 1970s, civil rights leaders worked to
equalize the legal and political rights of African Americans.313 The
effort largely succeeded: discrimination in voting, employment,
housing, and other areas by both government and private entities
was forbidden.314 Additional antidiscrimination laws probably
would not produce major benefits. First, antidiscrimination laws
in employment work best on large employers, for which statistical
patterns can be shown and litigation achieves economies of scale
by handling several cases at once. 5 Hence antidiscrimination
laws give a competitive advantage to smaller firms, which are
harder to sue and not covered at all by some of these laws.
Some employers diminish the bite of these laws by hiring fewer
minorities to begin with, since discrimination in hiring is harder
to prove than discrimination in firing or promotion.1 6 Some em-
ployers simply locate facilities where few minorities live.31 7 Oth-
ers use independent contractors, who often are not covered by
discrimination laws, instead of employees.318 Enactment and en-
forcement of antidiscrimination laws may also backfire by convey-
ing the impression that discrimination is more common than it
actually is, thereby erroneously increasing resentment among
minorities and suggesting to whites that discrimination is socially
(if not legally) acceptable. 9
313. See generally JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED
BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1994) (chronicling the
civil rights movement).
314. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
315. See Jane Howard-Martin, A Critical Analysis of Judicial Opinions in Professional
Employment Discrimination Cases, 26 HOW. L.J. 723, 727 (1983).
316. See Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, The Unintended Consequences of the '91 Civil
Rights Act, REG., Summer 2003, at 42, 47 (concluding that because of the 1991 Act, "em-
ployers with higher susceptibility to employment discrimination litigation reduced their
hiring of protected workers").
317. Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmation Action, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1037,
1072-73 (1996) (indicating that incentive programs are used to lure business to economi-
cally depressed areas).
318. These avoidance tactics do not mean that these employers are racially biased. A
racially homogeneous workforce may be more profitable. See supra note 117. Also, litiga-
tion is expensive even if the employer is ultimately exonerated. Unbiased employers may
take steps to minimize minority employment to avoid these costs. See Oyer & Schaefer,
supra note 316, at 47.
319. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
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Antidiscrimination laws still play a positive role. They not only
prevent and remedy discrimination but also signal, through the
expressive function of law, that our society cares about minorities
and condemns racial bias. The potential of antidiscrimination
laws is limited, though. To make major progress toward racial
harmony and equality, we must look elsewhere.
VI. POSSIBLE STEPS
The primary purpose of this Article is not to propose programs
to reduce racial inequality, but to show how principles of trust
can facilitate such programs. It may be useful to identify some
helpful steps, however. These measures will not appeal to all and
do not comprise a total agenda. Again, though, a national consen-
sus is unnecessary; many of these steps can be taken by state or
local governments or private groups. Although they are limited,
cooperation on these steps could raise interracial trust: "The joint
solution of conflict can enhance and deepen trust, in several
ways."32° Increased trust can dispel pessimism and trigger posi-
tive norm cascades and so ignite a virtuous cycle of improved be-
havior and interracial cooperation. The measures suggested en-
tail both concrete programs and the expressive function of law.
A. Social Welfare Measures
Antipoverty measures disproportionately benefit blacks,321 but
are new programs politically viable now? Even the Clinton Ad-
ministration tightened standards for welfare programs,322 and the
George W. Bush Administration has extended these efforts. Still,
much can be done. First, projects by state and local governments
and private groups are possible. Second, even the present admini-
stration supports some social welfare programs through faith-
based initiatives.323 President Bush and many other Republicans
acknowledge a religious duty to help the needy.324 Since religion
320. NOOTEBOOM, supra note 24, at 93.
321. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text (documenting economic inequality
of African Americans).
322. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
323. See Thomas W. Ross, The Faith-Based Initiative: Anti-Poverty or Anti-Poor?, 9
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POLY 167, 167-71 (2002).
324. See id. at 167.
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and churches are so strong among American minorities, blacks
can join Hispanics and other minorities, Republicans, and many
Democrats to urge action to discharge that duty. It helps that
many religious minority leaders share the preference of conserva-
tives for programs that seek to improve the conduct of recipients.
1. Trade-In Racial Preferences
Beneficial programs could be enacted in exchange for a trade-in
of racial preferences. Until recently, a trade-in might have been
dismissed by conservatives hoping that the Supreme Court would
soon forbid them anyway. The Court's recent rulings dispel that
hope,325 but they also impose conditions that make racial prefer-
ences even less valuable than before to blacks. Thus, a trade-in is
now more attractive for both sides. Blacks in Congress will not
readily accept a trade-in; they are politically wedded to prefer-
ences and to the black elite that most benefits from them. Almost
all have safe seats and are more concerned with increasing their
influence in the Democratic Party than with striking deals with
Republicans. Blacks outside of Congress lack these conflicting in-
terests and could discuss a trade-in. Such a deal would boost the
popularity of the President and Republicans with minorities
while pleasing conservatives by ending preferences.
Preferences could be ended by amending the Civil Rights Acts
to make explicit what was intended when they were enacted: for-
bidding racial discrimination by agencies of state, local, and fed-
eral governments (including state colleges and universities), by
private recipients of government money (including firms that re-
ceive government contracts and private colleges and universities
that receive government money), and businesses engaged in in-
terstate commerce.326
325. See, e.g., Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, Colo., 540 U.S.
1027, 1027 (2003) (denying a petition for review of Denver's use of preferences in awarding
public construction contracts).
326. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 to 2000h-6 (2000 & Supp. 1 2001).
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2. Education and Job Training
Increased education raises incomes.327 Pell Grants, the core
federal program for poor college students, once covered eighty-
four percent of the cost of a four-year public university; they now
cover only forty-two percent. Raising Pell Grants would enable
thousands more African Americans to get a college education,
which benefits not only themselves, their families, and their
communities, but also the entire nation by increasing overall pro-
ductivity and reducing social pathology. Racial preferences, by
contrast, do not increase black enrollments at all since those who
receive such preferences would attend college anyway.
Cooperation could also expand choice in education. Most blacks
support voucher and charter school programs that give parents a
choice of school. 29 Political conservatives and many other white
and minority parents also support these initiatives.3 Unfortu-
nately, politics have blocked these options at the national level. 3
Blacks in Congress oppose them, probably because teacher unions
are a juggernaut in the Democratic Party.3 2 Most Republican leg-
islators also ignore school choice because their suburban con-
stituents are content with their public schools and alternatives
would draw off students, thereby reducing economies of scale in
the public schools.333 By contrast, many African Americans con-
sider their schools inadequate. 34 Vouchers and charter schools
would not eliminate economies of scale in large cities, and black
students profit from these choices. 5 It may, therefore, be possible
327. See Lynn A. Karoly, Investing in the Future: Reducing Poverty Through Human
Capital Investments, in UNDERSTANDING POVERTY 314, 321 (Sheldon H. Danziger &
Robert H. Haveman eds., 2001).
328. See France & Symonds, supra note 257, at 30; Editorial, Punishing the Pell Grant
Program, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2003, at A24.
329. See Clint Bolick, Schools That Work for Minority Students, in BEYOND THE COLOR
LINE, supra note 110, at 277, 285-86 (reporting results of several polls); Samuel G.
Freedman, Increasingly, African-Americans Take Flight to Private Schools, N.Y. TIMES,
May 19, 2004, at Bl.
330. See, e.g., James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice,
111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2051 n.23 (2002).
331. See id. at 2079.
332. See id. at 2082.
333. See id.
334. See generally Bolick, supra note 329, at 277, 278-81 (describing problems of pre-
dominantly African-American public schools).
335. See Jay P. Greene & Marcus A. Winters, Competition Passes the Test, EDUC. NEXT,
Summer 2004, at 66, 68-69 (finding that vouchers improved public school performance in
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to enact voucher plans limited to urban areas or to low income
families.3" Given the hostility of Democrats and the indifference
of Republicans to vouchers at the national level,337 local programs
are more plausible for now.
More effort should be made to urge black students toward ca-
reers in business. That is where the money is. Blacks thrive in
many fields, especially entertainment, sports, and politics, but
few do so in business.3 Increasing the number of successful black
business people would promote economic equality and counter
stereotypes that blacks are less capable than whites in some ar-
eas. Increasing interracial commerce would also improve race re-
lations. "Doing business with people, even at a distance, usually
involves acknowledging their humanity."339
All schools should be required to set high standards for all stu-
dents, and parents should be exhorted to help their children meet
these standards.34 ° Like other measures recommended here, this
one would not be limited to blacks and would probably benefit
more whites; however, blacks would reap a disproportionate
share of the benefits because of the current racial achievement
gap in education. Many schools produce good academic results
with students of disadvantaged backgrounds. 3 1 A large fraction of
these are charter or private schools, but some are just well-run
Florida); Greg Winter, Charter Schools Succeed in Improving Test Scores, Study Says,
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2003, at A24.
336. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 330, at 2047.
337. See supra notes 332-33 and accompanying text.
338. See FLOYD H. FLAKE & M. ELAINE MCCOLLINS FLAKE, PRACTICAL VIRTUES:
EVERYDAY VALUES AND DEVOTIONS FOR AFRICAN AMERICAN FAMILIES xv-xvi (2003) (argu-
ing that adulation of hip-hop celebrities and athletes has been particularly damaging to
black youth by eroding traditional African-American morals); Brent Staples, Editorial,
Broken Hoop Dreams for the Basketball Players of Coney Island, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2004,
§ 4, at 10 (describing the deceptive lure of professional sports to the detriment of education
among young blacks).
339. Robert Wright, Editorial, Two Years Later, a Thousand Years Ago, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 2003, at A25.
340. Rigor of curriculum and parent participation are two important elements of educa-
tional achievement and of the current "achievement gap" between black and white stu-
dents. See Educational Testing Service, Parsing the Achievement Gap: Baselines for Track-
ing Progress 8-9, 20-21 (2003) [hereinafter Parsing the Achievement Gap]; see also ZOCH,
supra note 244, at 198 (arguing that American schools need to demand more of students of
all colors).
341. See ABIGAIL THERNSTROM & STEPHAN THERNSTROM, No EXCUSES: CLOSING THE
RACIAL GAP IN LEARNING 43 (2003).
2005] 1059
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
public schools.342 All of these schools insist on order, discipline,
testing, parental involvement, and high student performance.343
Those whose education still leaves them suboptimally em-
ployed should have access to good job training, which is another
win-win measure for blacks and whites.44
3. Tax Relief for Low Income Workers
Another fertile field for interracial agreement is tax relief for
low income workers. Welfare reform freed many people from de-
pendence on government handouts, but the newly employed-and
many other low wage workers-remain in or near poverty. 45 Al-
though they pay no federal income taxes, they face heavy Social
Security charges and state and local taxes.346 Lowering their
taxes would pay three dividends. It would raise incentives to get
off welfare and stay off. Most beneficiaries will quickly spend the
added income, thereby stimulating economic demand. And this
boost will be concentrated in minority neighborhoods that espe-
cially need it.
A further step is to expand the Earned Income Tax Credit
("EITC").
A parent earning $10,000 a year can qualify for as much as $4,000 a
year in tax refunds. This is the equivalent of turning a $6-an-hour
job into an $8.40-an-hour job. Unlike an increase in the minimum
wage, it doesn't affect employers' labor costs and hence their willing-
ness to hire low-skilled workers. And it has a powerful record of en-
couraging work.
347
342. See id. at 43-44.
343. See id. at 39-40, 47-49, 55-60, 69-70; see also Parsing the Achievement Gap, su-
pra note 340, at 18-19 (finding that school safety is an important element of student
achievement and of the current "achievement gap" between African-American and white
students).
344. See Holzer & Offher, supra note 133, at 83-84 (suggesting that low-income men
should have access to job training).
345. See supra notes 289-90 and accompanying text.
346. See, e.g., Jonathan Chait, For Richer; Conservatives v. Capitalism, NEW REPUBLIC,
Oct. 29, 2001, at 15; Conlin & Bernstein, supra note 235, at 64 ("Payroll taxes are a huge
burden on the working poor.").
347. Isabel V. Sawhill, The Behavioral Aspects of Poverty, PUB. INT., Fall 2003, at 79,
92; see also Holzer & Offner, supra note 133, at 83 (advocating an expanded EITC). An-
other advantage of raising the EITC rather than the minimum wage is that much of the
latter goes to workers who are not poor, like middle-class teenagers working to make extra
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4. Criminal Laws
Blacks and whites should cooperate to reform criminal laws.
Minorities, especially blacks, have been devastated by the huge
number of criminal convictions and incarcerations, especially in
the "war on drugs. 348 Many minority neighborhoods have been
ruined by drugs and the crime that attends their sale and use;
3 49
we must not accept this. The war on drugs, however, has failed; it
does not reduce drug abuse or even raise the street price of
drugs."' Simply releasing jailed drug offenders would wreak
more havoc on already ravaged neighborhoods. This danger can
be reduced by freeing only prisoners less likely to commit crimes
and then subjecting those released to rehabilitation and careful
monitoring.
No such program can be perfect; many participants will re-
lapse, but the net effect will be positive. Criminal conviction and
imprisonment of black men are now so common that they have
lost their stigma in black communities and even to some extent
become normative; to many, an initial arrest and conviction are
not a disgrace but a rite of passage. 35 1 Long sentences for mere
possession or small sales of drugs diminish respect for law among
the many people who consider these sentences unjust. 2 Reducing
arrests and incarceration would improve respect for law and rela-
tions with police in minority communities.
Whites would also benefit from these steps. Many whites also
incur excessive and counterproductive criminal sentences. The
high cost of prisons is straining state budgets.5 3 Some states are
spending money.
348. See Thomas Adcock, Old-Fashioned Politics; Attorneys/ Candidates Discover a
Winning Strategy in Door-to-Door Democratic Campaigns, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 8, 2004, at 16
(describing a district attorney candidate who campaigned on the idea that drug laws have
an unfair impact on minorities).
349. See Stephen Ohlemacher, Proposals Target Sentencing Bias, HARTFORD COURANT,
Apr. 6, 1999, at A3 (noting the disparate impact of illegal drugs and crime on minority
neighborhoods).
350. See generally Adcock, supra note 348 (noting politician's belief in the ineffective-
ness of drug laws).
351. See LOURY, supra note 141, at 80-81, 201 fig.19 (reporting that the incarceration
rate for black males is seven times that of white males).
352. Angela P. Harris, Criminal Justice as Environmental Justice, 1 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 1, 30 (1997) (stating that "the extremely high number of neighborhood men under
the control of the criminal justice system itself can reduce respect for the law").
353. See Fox Butterfield, With Cash Tight, States Reassess Long Jail Terms, N.Y.
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reacting by lowering prison populations with early release pro-
grams.
354
5. Immigration
America is inundated with unskilled immigrants who compete
for jobs with unskilled natives.3 55 The impact is evident in the re-
sponse of blacks, who are fleeing regions of high immigration. 6
The claim that unskilled immigrants take only jobs that natives
do not want 357 is debunked by economist Robert Kuttner: "funny
thing-when employers pay decently, American workers wait in
line all night to apply."5 ' Reducing immigration would not only
provide jobs for many natives who would otherwise be unem-
ployed, but would also put upward pressure on wages for the low-
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2003, at Al.
354. See Editorial, Creating the Next Crime Wave, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2004, at A16
("In recent years, 25 states have eased sentencing policies and reinstated early release and
treatment programs for drug offenders, now about a quarter of the nation's prisoners.");
Adam Liptak, Sentences Are Too Long or Too Short. Rarely, Just Right, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
24, 2003, § 4, at 3 ("Several financially strapped states.., have eased sentencing laws in
the past year.").
355. See GEORGE J. BORJAS, HEAVEN'S DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE AMERICAN
ECONOMY 19-20, 66-67 (1999); STEVEN A. CAMAROTA, CENTER FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES,
IMMIGRATION FROM MEXICO: ASSESSING THE IMPACT ON THE UNITED STATES 21-23, 27-28
(2001); Roger 0. Crockett, Why Are Latinos Leading Blacks in the Job Market?, BUS. WK.,
Mar. 15, 2004, at 70 (quoting Reverend Jesse Jackson saying that many Latinos "are
hired to do work that blacks once had'").
356. This migration is logical; while median household incomes generally rose during
the 1990s, they fell in areas of high immigration. See Peter Y. Hong, The U.S. Census:
Data Reflects California's Highs, Lows, L.A. TIMES, June 5, 2002, at B1; Scott Martelle &
Erin Chan, Income Drop in 90s Cut a Broad Swath, Data Show, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27,
2002, at B1; Janny Scott, Census Finds Rising Tide, and Many Who Missed Boat, N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 2002, at B1; Janny Scott, Manhattanites Fared Best in New York City in
1990s, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2002, at B4. Ironically, many go to the old Confederacy.
Vernon M. Briggs, Jr., Editorial, Immigration Policy Sends Blacks Back to South, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 1990, at A22.
357. See Jean Baldwin Grossman, The Substitutability of Natives and Immigrants in
Production, 64 REV. ECON. & STAT. 596, 602 (1982) (stating that the influx of immigration
does not seriously affect natives); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NEW AMERICANS:
ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 218 (James P. Smith &
Barry Edmonston eds., 1997).
358. Robert Kuttner, Bush's Cynical Immigration Gambit, BUS. WK., Feb. 9, 2004, at
20.
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skilled.359 These workers would benefit further if given tax relief
so that they could take home more of their wages.36 °
Cheap immigrant labor keeps prices down. 61 Immigrant work-
ers are also more docile because they fear that any trouble will
lead to their deportation, especially if they are here illegally.362
Competition from immigrants intimidates native workers who
might otherwise be more assertive.363 The benefits of immigrant
labor are outweighed, though, by its costs. In areas of high immi-
gration, local governments are overwhelmed by the added cost of
social services and law enforcement.364 Increased unemployment
and lower incomes of natives also create social costs.
365
Politicians of both parties hesitate to restrict immigration both
because of donations from employers of immigrants and for fear
of offending voters from ethnic groups with many immigrants.
Black politicians share this reluctance. Like their hostility to
school vouchers, it stems partly from concern for their standing in
the Democratic Party. Most Americans, however, want to reduce
immigration.366 Private groups and sympathetic politicians in
both races should publicize this issue and pressure the federal
government to act.
359. Conlin & Bernstein, supra note 235, at 62 ("Curbing the flood of unskilled immi-
grants... would ease some of the gravitational pressure on low-end pay.").
360. See supra notes 345-46 and accompanying text.
361. See Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Who Left the Door Open?, TIME, Sept. 20,
2004, at 52 ("[M] any citizens quietly benefit from the flood of illegals because the supply of
cheap labor helps keep down the cost of many goods and services....").
362. Further, "employers-some of whom are nonwhite themselves-say they find in-
ner-city employees [who are largely Black] to be unreliable." Mead, supra note 220, at 65.
363. See Ryan D. Frei, Comment, Reforming U.S. Immigration Policy in an Era of
Latin American Immigration: The Logic Inherent in Accommodating the Inevitable, 39 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1379-80 (2005).
364. See ROY BECK, THE CASE AGAINST IMMIGRATION: THE MORAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL,
AND ENVIRONMENTAL REASONS FOR REDUCING U.S. IMMIGRATION BACK TO TRADITIONAL
LEVELS 203 (1996); Eric Bailey & Dan Morain, Anti-Immigration Bills Flood Legislature,
L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1993, at A3.
365. See BECK, supra note 364, at 203-04.
366. See Stephen Dinan, Americans Oppose Increase in Immigration, WASH. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 2004, at Al.
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6. Encouraging Charity
One problem with government social welfare programs is that
they diminish donations to private charities.367 Also, cuts in the
highest federal income tax rates reduce the tax benefits of chari-
table donations by the wealthy, who are the largest donors.368
Those concerned about the needy should support government ac-
tion to encourage private charity.
The proposed Charity Aid, Recovery, and Empowerment
("CARE") Act of 2003 was approved by the Senate on April 9,
2003, and was introduced in the House of Representatives. 369 It
would increase the tax incentives for much charitable giving.3 10
One problem with private charity is that much of it goes to activi-
ties that give little or no aid to the needy.7 1 Many of these activi-
ties (the arts, for instance) are worthy, but the poor need more
help, and the disproportionate number of blacks among the needy
strengthens the case for action. Federal, state, and local govern-
ments should give better tax treatment to philanthropy for the
poor. The expressive function of government should also be used
to promote philanthropy simply by publicizing the efforts and ac-
complishments of charities for the poor.
B. The Expressive Function of Law
If race relations were rational, there would be no problem to
discuss-all groups benefit from cooperation and trust. Sadly,
race relations often provoke irrational emotions. Racial harmony
is also hindered by subgroups that profit from racial separation
and strife. The government influences race relations by affecting
367. See A. Abigail Payne, Does the Government Crowd Out Private Donations? New
Evidence from a Sample of Non-Profit Firms, 69 J. PUB. ECON. 323, 324-25, 343 (1998);
Richard Steinberg, Does Government Spending Crowd Out Donations?: Interpreting the
Evidence, 62 ANNALS PUB. & COOP. ECON. 591, 591 (1991). But see Cagla Okten & Burton
A. Weisbrod, Determinants of Donations in Private Nonprofit Markets, 75 J. PUB. ECON.
255, 268, 271 (2000).
368. See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax Reform: Threats to Subsidies Overt and
Covert, 66 TENN. L. REV. 687, 694 (1999).
369. Charity Aid, Recovery, and Empowerment Act of 2003, S. 272, 108th Cong. (2003).
370. See Scott M. Michelman, Faith-Based Initiatives, 39 HARv. J. LEGIS. 475, 475 n.8
(2002).
371. See Michael M. Burns, Fearing the Mirror: Responding to Beggars in a "Kinder
and Gentler" America, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 783, 802 (1992).
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not just people's material interests, but also their attitudes
through its expressive function.372 Despite extensive (and often
justified) skepticism about government in America today, the
prestige of the law remains high. Thus, opposing groups battle
fiercely about whether the Confederate flag will fly over the
South Carolina state house373 and about the Supreme Court's dis-
position of criminal sodomy laws that are almost never en-
forced.3 4 These controversies entail few material consequences,
but the results can significantly alter public opinion.
The effects of the expressive function of government are slight
when people's beliefs are firmly entrenched, but much greater in
areas like race where beliefs are ambivalent, amorphous, and
volatile.375 Government's expressive influence is greatest in na-
tional institutions, especially the presidency, Congress, and the
federal courts, but local governments can also play a role. The
Republican Party could be especially influential. In most elec-
tions, the majority of whites vote Republican,376 so blacks realize
that Democrats, even a Democratic president, do not speak for
most white Americans. A commitment to racial equality from Re-
publicans would indicate a general consensus among whites.
Government can improve race relations by simply teaching
that everyone benefits from racial trust and cooperation. Most
people do not instinctively grasp this truth; fear and suspicion of
others seems to be more natural, especially with racial groups
that look different. 377 Fear and suspicion are abetted by the re-
lated misconception that human relations are zero sum games so
that any gain by one group must come at the expense of others.
Government can counter this error by proclaiming the opportu-
nity for mutually profitable, win-win results from collaboration.
372. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
373. See Jim Davenport, S.C. Removes Rebel Flag from Statehouse, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE (West Virginia), July 2, 2000, at AS; Rick Freeman, S. Carolina's Allegiance to
the Flag; State is a Sports Outcast Because of Confederate Link, WASH. POST, May 20,
2000, at D1.
374. See Melanie C. Falco, Comment, The Road Not Taken: Using the Eighth Amend-
ment to Strike Down Criminal Punishment for Engaging in Consensual Sexual Acts, 82
N.C. L. REV. 723, 723-24, 752 (2004); Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Inju-
ries Inflicted by "Unenforced" Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103, 103-04
(2000).
375. See supra text accompanying notes 176-78.
376. JAMES M. GLASER, RACE, CAMPAIGN POLITICS, AND THE REALIGNMENT IN THE
SOUTH 9 (1996).
377. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
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By its expressive function, government also influences
norms. 378 Again, moral suasion is most effective not when it at-
tacks deeply held norms, but when it shows people that one of
their norms conflicts with another norm that they value more
highly. The abolitionists persuaded most Americans that their
Christian faith demanded liberty for all, including slaves, and
that their own forefathers had so proclaimed in the Declaration of
Independence .1 9 Today, government can inculcate not just toler-
ance, but respect and care for other groups by reminding us that,
like the Good Samaritan, we are our brother's keeper.8 °
No particular plan is required for this purpose; care and re-
spect can be shown in many ways. Some manifestations can be
purely expressive, as in statements and personal gestures of
friendship and concern. Such statements are rightly dismissed as
empty rhetoric, though, unless backed by concrete acts. Govern-
ment leaders do not enhance trust if they profess concern about
education for African Americans but take no action while oppos-
ing racial preferences in schools.
Race relations are affected not only by attitudes about race per
se but by the attitudes of the prosperous to the needy. Many
whites harbor no bias against blacks but do little on their own to
help the poor and generally oppose such help from government.8 1
Because the poor are disproportionately black,8 2 many African
Americans suspect these whites of racism. The suspicion may be
mostly wrong, but given the history of race in America, it is to be
expected. Even if they believe denials of racial prejudice, many
poor Americans, white as well as black, resent refusals of the
comfortable to help them.38 3
Here again the expressive power of government can be decisive.
Most people's attitudes about the poor are mutable.3 4 They are
378. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text.
379. See Michael Kent Curtis, The Curious History of Attempts to Suppress Antislavery
Speech, Press, and Petition in 1835-37, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 785, 798-99 (1995); see also su-
pra note 209 and accompanying text
380. See supra note 213.
381. See Amy L. Chua, The Paradox of Free Market Democracy: Rethinking Develop-
ment Policy, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 287, 320 (2000).
382. See Reginald Leamon Robinson, "The Other Against Itself': Deconstructing the Vio-
lent Discourse Between Korean and African Americans, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 15, 78-79
(1993); supra notes 113 and accompanying text.
383. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
384. See Michelle S. Jacobs, Full Legal Representation for the Poor: The Clash Between
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influenced, inter alia, by the expected effectiveness of the help,
the level of contributions by others, and the merit of recipients. 5
Thus, in addition to promoting government aid to the poor, gov-
ernment leaders can publicize successes achieved through private
charity and the cooperation of the recipients.
People are also motivated by ideals; this includes "visions about
what the future could bring if only the dispute that confronts
them can be surmounted."386 Many politicians are loathe to pro-
claim ideals; the first President Bush scoffed at the "vision
thing."387 Optimism also collides with the fatalism about race pro-
pounded by people like Derrick Bell and a broader skepticism
about human behavior that now seems pervasive in America."'
But Judaism and Christianity project visions of universal broth-
erhood and of a society transfigured by concern for the needy.
America, more than any other nation, was founded on a vision of
liberty, the "pursuit of happiness,"389 and "a more perfect Union"
that would "promote the general Welfare."39 ° To envision a better
world is as American as apple pie, and high government officials
can use their prestige to inspire us to strive for that vision. Such
efforts not only influence many people directly but can also pre-
cipitate a "norm cascade" that sweeps up others.39'
Some so-called conservatives deny that social progress is possi-
ble, 392 but the Judeo-Christian principles embraced by most con-
servatives forbid such despair, and the success of America itself
empirically refutes it.393 The vision of racial harmony and equal-
ity is also appealing because it entails the practical as well as the
idealistic-all Americans would gain from it. Thus leaders should
not stress the sacrifices necessary to achieve this vision, although
Lawyer Values and Client Worthiness, 44 HOW. L. J. 257, 298-99 (2001).
385. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
386. Raiffa, supra note 278, at 140.
387. See Mary McGrory, Faint-Hearted Phrasemakers, WASH. POST, July 24, 1988, at
C1.
388. See generally JEDEDIAH PURDY, FOR COMMON THINGS: IRONY, TRUST, AND
COMMITMENT IN AMERICA TODAY xi-xv, 38-39 (1999) (describing and decrying the skepti-
cism).
389. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
390. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
391. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
392. See John L. Hill, Note, Freedom, Determinism, and the Externalization of Respon-
sibility in the Law: A Philosophical Analysis, 76 GEO. L.J. 2045, 2069 & n.95 (1988).
393. See supra notes 167-69.
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the task will be expensive and emotionally difficult; such mes-
sages are not well received in our self-centered, materialistic age.
Rather they should stress material profits to be earned in the fu-
ture and the honor, pride, and satisfaction to be gained now.
Pursuit of common goals can be thwarted by subgroup inter-
ests.394 Republicans may hesitate to increase Pell Grants because
much of the benefit would go to people who would not vote for
them anyway. Instead, they would prefer to cut taxes or provide
benefits for their own supporters. On the other side, blacks in
Congress hesitate to trade in racial preferences or to cooperate
with Republicans because some of their influential constituents
benefit from preferences and because cooperation would boost
Republicans at the expense of Democrats.
It would be naive to exhort politicians to reject special interests
and serve the common good. As public choice theory shows, gov-
ernment officials are normal humans-they generally pursue
their own interests by favoring those who can elect, hire, promote,
or fire them.39 Like others, public officials sometimes rise above
self-interest and act altruistically, especially if the costs to them
are low. Altruism alone, however, will not effect major change on
important issues. A more promising path is for citizens concerned
about the poor to exert political pressure that makes it profitable
for government officials to address their concerns. Since new,
powerful grass roots movements are rare, it is more likely that
existing institutions could change their agendas to apply more of
the desired pressure on government.
CONCLUSION
Racial inequality remains America's biggest problem. The dis-
advantaged state of so many African Americans is not only unjust
but also costly to whites. In recent decades, progress in narrowing
this disparity has slowed to a crawl. This inertia is especially
frustrating because there are many helpful steps on which most
Americans can agree. These measures are not being taken now
because mistrust between the races thwarts collaboration. Tech-
394. See generally discussion supra Part II.A.
395. For an explanation of public choice theory, see Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice in
Perspective, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 1, 3-8 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997).
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niques for reducing suspicion and building trust have been identi-
fied and applied in many contexts, including some local efforts at
racial cooperation. This Article has discussed these techniques
and shown how they could be used to break out of the current
stalemate and achieve real progress toward equality.

